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INTRODUcrION

In the late 1960s, colleges and universities faced economic
hardship due, in part, to inflation and low enrollments. 1 The
problems were exacerbated because, even if an institution had en
dowment funds or other gifts, the common law of charitable trusts
imposed two important restrictions on their use. 2 First, trustees
were limited to a fairly conservative "prudent man" investment
strategy.3 Second, if a charitable gift had a restriction on its use,
and the restriction was outmoded, the institution could alter the
terms of the restriction only by obtaining the court's permission
through the doctrine of cy pres. 4 The college or university thus had
1. See Mary Schmid Daugherty, Commentary, Uniform Management of Institu
tional Funds Act-The Implications for Private College Board of Regents, 57 EDUC. L.
REP. 319, 319 (1990); infra Part 1.e.1.
2. "The law governing the enforcement of charitable gifts is derived from the law
of charitable trusts." Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d
995,997 n.2 (Conn. 1997) (citing 4A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCUIT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 348.1 (4th ed. 1989)); see also Steeneck v. University
of Bridgeport, 668 A.2d 688, 695 (Conn. 1995).
A charitable trust is distinguished from a private trust in that the "property is de
voted to purposes beneficial to the community." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 1 cmt. c (1959).
3. See Douglas M. Salaway, Note, UMIFA and a Model for Endowment Investing,
22 J.C. & U.L. 1045, 1054 (1995-96). See infra Part I.C.l for a discussion of the prudent
man standard and other limits on trustees.
4. Cy pres is a common law doctrine that allows a charitable gift to be used for a
different purpose when the original purpose cannot be executed. See Hartford Hosp. v.
Blumenthal, No. CV-95-0555462-S, 1996 WL 240440, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 15,
1996). See infra Part I.A.4 for a thorough discussion of the common law doctrine of cy
pres through which charitable institutions can alter the terms of restricted charitable
gifts.
A charitable gift is a "gift for a general public use ... for the benefit of an indefi
nite number of persons, and designed to benefit them from an educational, religious,
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to incur litigation costs.
Under common law, a college or university must obtain the
court's permission to alter a gift restriction even if the donor con
sents to changing the restriction. This is because once a gift is com
plete, under common law, donor consent has no legal effect on the
terms of the gift. s In addition, if the trustees of a charitable institu
tion alter the terms of a charitable gift without obtaining the court's
permission, only the Attorney General has standing to sue to en
force the terms of the completed gift. The donor has no standing to
sue unless the donor reserves a specific right to control the property
in the gift instrument. 6
In 1969, the Ford Foundation commissioned a study to examine
the concerns over the common law restrictions on grants to educa
tional institutionsJ As a result of the study, in 1972, the Commis
sioners on Uniform State Laws introduced the Uniform
Management of Institutional Funds Act ("UMIFA") to help col
leges and universities. s UMIFA contained two changes for charita
ble institutions: it allowed the institutions to make riskier
moral, physical or social standpoint." American Soc'y for Testing & Materials v. Board
of Revision of Taxes, Philadelphia County, 225 A.2d 557, 560 (Pa. 1967) (quoting In re
Hill Sch., 87 A.2d 259, 262 (Pa. 1952)).
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959).
6. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 997-98 (citing Marin Hosp. Dist. v. State Dep't of
Health, 154 Cal. Rptr. 838, 841 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Smith v. Thompson, 266 III. App.
165, 169 (1932)).
A common way to retain control over property is through reserving a reversionary
interest. A reversionary interest is a kind of forfeiture wherein the grantor "intends
that the [body of trust] reverts to himself or his heirs if the charitable purpose is not
served." Walton v. City of Red Bluff, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 280 n.9 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
(quoting In re Mareck, 100 N.W.2d 758, 762 (Minn. 1960)). Under such conditions, the
gift is not considered a trust, but a conditional gift. See id. Reserving some kind of
donor control over the gift, in the gift instrument, might create tax problems for the
donor. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 100l.
7. See UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT Prefatory Note, 7A
Part II U.L.A. 476-77 (1999), discussed infra Part I.e.l. The study was important be
cause college trustees believed that they had a legal imperative to invest conservatively.
See id. The study was WILLIAM L. CARY & CRAIG B. BRIGHT, THE LAW AND THE
LORE OF ENDOWMENT FUNDS (1969). See Joel e. Dobris, Real Return, Modern Portfo
lio Theory, and College, University, and Foundation Decisions on Annual Spending from
Endowments: A Visit to the World of Spending Rules, 28 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 49,
52 n.10 (1993).
8. See Salaway, supra note 3, at 1057-58; UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL
FUNDS ACT, 7A Part II U.L.A. 475 (1999).
"The committee which acted for the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws" which prepared UMIFA consisted of seven individuals who were
lawyers and law professors from six different states. See UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTI
TUTIONAL FUNDS ACT Historical Notes, 7A Part II U.L.A. 476 (1999).
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investments for higher returns and created an easier way to release
restrictions on charitable gifts. 9
In 1973, the Connecticut legislature passed the Connecticut
Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act ("CUMIFA").1°
Closely replicating UMIFA,ll CUMIFA's adoption reflected Con
necticut's growing concern over the financial health of its colleges
and universities,12 Like UMIFA, the law created two important
changes for charitable institutions. First, it allows trustees of chari
table institutions, including colleges and universities, to place the
money from their endowments in investments that will produce a
high return.13 Second, it provides trustees with a mechanism for
changing restrictions on gifts: donor consent or, in the absence of a
donor, court approval.1 4
In 1991, the University of Bridgeport altered the terms of a
donor's completed, but restricted, gift without obtaining either the
consent of the available donor or the court, in violation of section
45a-533 of CUMIFA.15 The donor sued to enforce the restrictions
on the gift,16 In Carl J. Herzog Foundation, Inc. v. University of
Bridgeportp the Connecticut Supreme Court addressed the ques
tion of whether CUMIFA created a donor interest in the charitable
gift itself, thus granting the donor standing to sue. IS The court, in a
3-2 decision, held that the donor had no standing to sue under
9. See UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS Aer Prefatory Note, 7A
Part II U.L.A. 476-77 (1999), discussed infra Part I.C.1.
10. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45a-526 to -534 (1997).
11. See UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS Aer, 7A PART II U.L.A.
475 (1999). Connecticut added sections 45a-529a and 45a-529b to its version of
UMIFA. The issue in this Note, however, focuses on section 45a-533, which codifies
section 7 of UMIFA.
12. See 16 H.R. Proc., Pt. 11, 1973 Sess., at 5723 (Conn.) [hereinafter House Pro
ceeding]; Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 1, 1973 Sess., at 337
[hereinafter UMIFA Hearing].
13. See UMIFA Hearing, supra note 12, at 337; see also CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 45a-526 to -532 (1997); Dobris, supra note 7, at 51-52.
14. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-533(a)-(b) (1997); infra Parts II-III.
15. See Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 996
(Conn. 1997).
16. See id.
17. 699 A.2d 995 (Conn. 1997).
18. See id. at 999. The appeallate court and the trial court also focused on
whether CUMIFA created a donor interest in the gift itself. See Carl J. Herzog Found.,
Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 677 A.2d 1378, 1381-82 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996); Carl J.
Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, No. CV-94-0137902-S, 1995 WL
128255, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 17, 1995).
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CUMIFA.19 The majority held that because CUMIFA does not ex
plicitly state that the donor may sue to enforce CUMIFA's provi
sions, no interest was created in the donor, and the common law of
charitable trusts applied to the issue of standing. 20 The dissent in
the case endorsed the reasoning of the appellate court, which stated
that section 45a-533 of CUMIFA created an interest in the gift
which conferred donor standing to sue when the University of
Bridgeport violated CUMIFA's requirements. 21
The Herzog decision is important for two reasons. 22 First, this
is the first decision of any state court concerning standing under
CUMIFA's model, UMIFA, a uniform law adopted by at least
forty-four states and the District of Columbia. 23 As such, other
courts might look to this decision for guidance. 24 Second, the Con
necticut court's decision to deny donor standing under CUMIFA
may have a far reaching effect on charitable donations to universi
ties. As noted by the dissent in Herzog, the majority's decision may
result in donors being more reluctant to contribute to charitable
institutions when they realize that they will have no standing to sue
if their gift restrictions are ignored. 25
This Note discusses the interpretation of donor standing under
19. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1002; see also Jonathan Rabinovitz, Court Says Col
lege Donors Cannot Sue Over Gifts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1997, at B1.
20. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1002.
21. See id. at 1002 (McDonald, J., dissenting). The appellate court said that one
could imply standing from the section of the statute requiring the donor's written con
sent for the release of gift restrictions. See Herzog, 677 A.2d at 1385. The Connecticut
Supreme Court treated the issue as a question of a property interest in the gift. See
Herzog, 699 A.2d at 999. The appellate court was less clear about what the interest was,
but, in part, treated the interest as the donor's right to require the donee to obtain its
written consent for alterations of a completed gift. The appellate court also said that
the donor could withhold consent. See Herzog, 677 A.2d at 1381-82.
22. The New York Times covered the decision twice. See Karen W. Arenson,
Spending It; Making Those Good Causes Do What the Donor Intended, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 24, 1997, § 3, at 10; Rabinovitz, supra note 19.
23. As of 1999, the only states which had not adopted a version of UMIFA were
Alaska, Arizona, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota. See UNIF. MANAGE
MENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS Acr, 7A Part II U.L.A. 475-76 (1999); see also
Salaway, supra note 3, at 1048.
24. Connecticut courts are already citing this case as they consider donor standing
to sue, even though cases are not specifically being brought under CUMIFA. See, e.g.,
Russell v. Yale Univ., No. CV-97-0400425-S, 1997 WL 809974, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Dec. 31, 1997) (holding that under the principles established in Herzog, donor had no
standing to sue).
25. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1002 (McDonald, J., dissenting). See infra notes 276
78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fact that one practitioner has advised
estate planners to take the Herzog decision into account and create protection for do
nors in the gift instrument.
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CUMIFA by both the Connecticut Supreme Court in Herzog and
the Connecticut Appellate Court it overruled. Part I describes the
background information necessary to understand the issue raised in
the case. It discusses the common law of charitable trusts, the tax
implications for charitable gifts, the historic context in which
CUMIFA was proposed, including its legislative history, and stand
ing doctrine as it is applied in Connecticut. Part II presents the
reasoning of the trial and appellate courts, as well as the Connecti
cut Supreme Court's majority and dissenting opinions in Herzog. 26
Part III suggests that while CUMIFA created a legally protected
interest for donors, it was not an interest in the charitable gift itself,
as assumed by the Connecticut courts, but rather, an interest in a
particular process which CUMIFA requires to alter the terms of a
charitable gift. Relying on the United States Supreme Court deci
sions of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,27 Bennett v. Spear,28 and
National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank &
Trust CO.,29 Part III argues that once a court recasts the right that
CUMIFA created in the donor as a right to a process, injury is ap
parent and standing should be allowed. Part III also suggests that
casting the right created in the donor under CUMIFA as the right
to a process answers the concerns about donor standing which were
raised by the Connecticut courts' interpretations of CUMIFA in
Herzog.3o
I.

A.

CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE ORIGINS OF CUMIFA, AND
STANDING IN CONNECTICUT

Common Law of Charitable Trusts and the Doctrine of
Cy Pres
1.

Creating a Charitable Trust

Charitable gifts are governed by the law of charitable trustS. 31
26. Since the dissent in the case is very brief and simply endorsed the reasoning of
the appellate court, an analysis of the legal reasoning in the case necessarily involves
use of the appellate court decision.
27. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
28. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
29. 118 S. Ct. 927 (1998).
30. One concern the Connecticut Supreme Court expressed was tax implications
if donors controlled their charitable gifts. See infra Parts II-III for a complete discus
sion of the concerns of the Connecticut courts.
31. "The law governing the enforcement of charitable gifts is derived from the
law of charitable trusts." Carl I. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 699
A.2d 995, 997 n.2 (Conn. 1997) (citing 4A AUSTIN WAKEMAN Scorr & WILLIAM
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A charitable trust is a fiduciary relationship whereby the person
who holds charitable property or gifts has a duty to use the property
for charitable purposes. 32 A charitable trust is created when a do
nor manifests an intention to create such a trust and subjects the
donee to a duty to use the trust for charitable purposes. 33 It is not
the intention of the donor, but rather the purpose to which the
property is put, which determines whether a trust has been cre
ated. 34 The donor of property may either give the property to trust
ees to be held for charitable purposes or "transfer[] it to a
charitable corporation."35 If the donor makes a gift to a charitable
corporation, he may make it with or without restrictions on the use
of the gift.36 The charitable corporation must observe any restric
tions on the gift. 37
FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 348.1 (4th ed. 1989»; see also Steeneck v.
University of Bridgeport, 668 A.2d 688, 695 (Conn. 1995).
32. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 997 n.2. A charitable gift is a gift given to the public
where the beneficiaries are not defined. See 4A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM
FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 348, at 32 (4th ed. 1989); see also Herzog,
699 A.2d at 997 n.2 (citing Lefkowitz v. Lebensfeld, 417 N.Y.S.2d 715, 720 (App. Div.
1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 (1959». See supra note 4 for a more
detailed definition of charitable gift.
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 (1959). "A charitable trust is a
fiduciary relationship with respect to property arising as a result of a manifestation of
an intention to create it, and subjecting the person by whom the property is held to
equitable duties to deal with the property for a charitable purpose." Id.
34. See 4A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 32, § 348, at 6.
35. 4A id. § 348, at 8; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 cmt. c
(1959).
36. See 4A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 32, § 348.1, at 8-9; see also RESTATE·
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 cmt. f (1959). A charitable gift may be made
without any restrictions, in which case it may be used by the corporation in
such manner as it sees fit for the accomplishment of any of the purposes for
which it exists; or the gift may be restricted to the accomplishment of one of
the purposes for which the corporation exists; or it may be provided that the
corporation may devote the income to any of its purposes or to a particular
purpose, but shall not expend the principal.
4A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 32, § 348.1, at 9.
A donor simply writing out a check to "X College" would be an example of the
first kind of charitable gift. A donor who had a gift instrument requiring that its dona
tion be earmarked for scholarships for medical related degrees would be an example of
the second kind of gift. A donor whose gift instrument instructs that only the income
from the principal he is giving can be used for medical related degrees would be an
example of the third kind of gift. Where appropriate, Part I of this Note will build on
this example of gift restrictions.
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 cmt. f (1959) (stating that the
Attorney General will sue to enforce gift restrictions). The enforcement of gifts by the
Attorney General is discussed infra Part I.A.2.
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Revoking, Modifying, and Enforcing Charitable Trusts

If a donor creates a completed charitable gift, even one con
taining restrictions on its use, the donor loses control over the gift's
disposition. 38 This is because when a donor makes a charitable gift,
the beneficiary is not an individual, but the community.39 However,
a donor may modify or revoke a gift under two conditions: if the
donor has "reserved such a power, or if the omission to reserve
such power is due to a mistake. "40 In addition, unless a right to the
gift itself is reserved in the gift instrument, the terms of a charitable
gift can be enforced in only three ways: by the Attorney General or
other public official, by another trustee of the charitable trust, or by
someone who has a special interest. 41
The reason the Attorney General is charged with enforcing the
trust is because the Attorney General is the legal representative of
the community in the matter. 42 The Attorney General may initiate
the suit himself or may bring suit "on relation of a third person ...
[who] need not have any direct interest in the enforcement of the
trust."43 If the suit is brought at the request of the third party, the
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959).
39. See 4A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 32, § 348, at 8.
40. 4A id. § 367, at 113; see also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 367
(1959). Building upon the example of the donor's gift to a college for scholarships for
medical related degrees, unless the instrument explicitly stated that the donor retained
the right to the gift, the donor cannot redress any violation of the restrictions on the
gift. There have been exceptions, however. In New York, a university's alumni associa
tion which gave a professorship to an educational institution reserved the power to
nominate the professor. The association was allowed to sue to enforce the terms of the
gift. See 4A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 32, § 391, at 376 (citing Association
Alumni v. Theological Seminary, 57 N.E. 626 (N.Y. 1900».
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959). Section 391 states the
following:
A suit can be maintained for the enforcement of a charitable trust by the At
torney General or other public officer, or by a co-trustee, or by a person who
has a special interest in the enforcement of the charitable trust, but not by
persons who have no special interest or by the settlor or his heirs, personal
representatives or next of kin.
Id.
42. See 4A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 32, § 391, at 357-59. The tradition of
the Attorney General's office protecting the public has its roots in British history. It is
based on the idea of the monarch as parent (parens patriae) with a duty to protect his
subjects. In the United States the parens patriae is the state, and it is the Attorney
General who acts for the state. See Mary Grace Blasko et aI., Standing to Sue in the
Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F. L. REv. 37, 40 (1993).
43. 4A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 32, § 391, at 359. A "relator" is someone
who is allowed to "institute a proceeding in the name of the People or the attorney
general when the right to sue resides solely in that official." GEORGE GLEASON Bo
GERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 411, at 7 n.16 (2d ed.
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third party "is liable for costs which would otherwise have to be
paid by the state."44 In addition, if a person has no special interest
in the enforcement of a trust, he "cannot maintain a proceeding, by
mandamus or otherwise, to compel the Attorney General to bring
an [enforcement] action."45 The latter rule exists to reduce the like
lihood of charities having to contend with harassing litigation. 46
A co-trustee also may bring suit to enforce the terms of a chari
table truSt. 47 The suit may be an action to "compel the redress of a
breach of trust. "48 In such suits, the Attorney General must be
joined as a party to the action. 49
Individuals with a special interest also can sue to enforce the
terms of a trust. 50 Although a charitable trust does not name an
individual beneficiary, an individual who can show that he is enti
tled to receive a benefit from the trust "which is not merely the
benefit ... which the ... general public" receives from the trust, has
a special interest and may sue. 51 For example, if a charitable trust is
given for education, and if a particular individual is entitled to pref
erence under the trust, he may file suit to receive the benefit. 52 The
person with the special interest must join the Attorney General in
the suit so that the Attorney General may protect the public inter
est. 53 If the community is not affected by the outcome of the suit,
the person does not have to join the Attorney General.54
3. 'Tax Implications for Charitable Donations
If a donor reserves the right to enforce the terms of a charita

ble trust, he may face tax implications. Section 170 of the Internal
Revenue Code concerns tax deductions for charitable donations to
1991) (quoting Brown v. Memorial Nat'l Home Found., 329 P.2d 118, 133 (Cal. Ct. App.
1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 943 (1959»; see also Blasko et aI., supra note 42, at 49.
44. 4A SC01T & FRATCHER, supra note 32, § 391, at 359; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt. a (1959).
45. 4A SC01T & FRATCHER, supra note 32, § 391, at 361.
46. See 4A id. § 391, at 373; see also Blasko et aI., supra note 42, at 42.
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959).
48. 4A SC01T & FRATCHER, supra note 32, § 391, at 365.
49. See 4A id. The Attorney General must be joined when the suit is brought by
the trustee "for the construction of the instrument creating it, or to determine its valid
ity, or where a suit is brought by others to invalidate a charitable trust." 4A id.
50. See 4A id. § 391, at 366.
51. 4A id.
52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt. c (1959).
53. See 4A SC01T & FRATCHER, supra note 32, § 391, at 369.
54. See 4A id. § 391, at 370.
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charitable institutions. 55 Charitable institutions' include orgarnza
tions such as churches, educational institutions, hospitals, and foun
dations. 56 For federal income tax purposes, an individual who
donates to a charitable organization is allowed to deduct the
amount from his adjusted gross income. 57 However, a gift which
has a condition precedent cannot be taken as a deduction until the
condition is met. 58 A condition precedent on a gift would be a con
dition that had to be met in order for the gift to vest in the donee. 59
In addition, if a donor is giving a gift of property rather than cash,
the donor must "part with dominion and control over the property"
and must not "retain incidents of control," in order to receive a tax
deduction under section 170.60 Finally, donors are allowed to de
duct gifts of partial interest in property or in trust if the terms of the
gift meet the exceptions contained in section 170(f)(3).61

55. See LR.C. § 170 (West Supp. 1998).
56. See id. § 170(b)(I)(A)(i)-(viii).
57. See Barbara L. Kirschten & Carla A. Neeley, Charitable Contributions: In
come Tax Aspects, 521 Tax Mgmt. (BNA), at A-I (1993). There are limits on the
amount one can deduct from adjusted gross income. See id.; see also LR.C.
§ 170(b)(I)(A)(viii), 170(b)(I)(B).
There are five elements which make up a charitable contribution under section 170:
"(1) a transfer of, (2) money or property, (3) to a permissible donee, (4) that is both
voluntary and without receipt of economic consideration or benefit, and (5) that is in
the proper form." Kirschten & Neeley, supra, at A-2. If the gift is conditional, and
"may be defeated upon the happening of a condition subsequent, [IRS] Regs.
§ 1.170(A)-I(e) ... [allows a deduction] if the occurrence of the conditioned event
'appears on the date of the gift to be so remote as to be negligible.'" Id. at A-4.
58. See Kirschten & Neeley, supra note 57, at A-4.
59. See id.
60. Id. at A-8.
61. See id. at A-38. The exceptions for partial interest in property arise when: (1)
the partial interest in property is the donor's entire interest, (2) the donor gives an
undivided portion of the donor's entire interest, (3) the donation is a remainder interest
in a personal residence or farm, (4) the donation is a qualified contribution for conser
vation purposes (e.g., preserving land or open space, historic sites), (5) the donation is a
future interest in personal property, (6) if the partial interest would be deductible if
transferred in trust, and (7) if the donor's retained interest is not substantial. See id. at
A-38 to A-47. "The test [for insubstantial interest] is whether the interest retained by
the donor is so insubstantial that the donor has in substance transferred his entire inter
est." Id. at A-47.
A contribution in trust can be given by splitting the trust between charitable and
non-charitable beneficiaries. See id. at A-47 to A-57. The deduction in such circum
stances is allowed only if the remainder interest of the trust is in one of the following
forms: (1) charitable remainder annuity trust, (2) charitable remainder unitrust, or (3)
pooled income fund. See Bonnie Brier & Jennifer J. Knauer, Charitable Remainder
Trusts and Pooled Income Funds, 435-2nd Tax Mgmt. (BNA) (1995).
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Cy Pres

Cy pres is a doctrine which allows the court to alter a charita
ble gift when the gift's specific terms cannot be fulfilled. 62 The doc
trine applies only to charitable trusts and corporations. 63 It is
applied when the donor has not reserved a right of control over the
charitable trust and the fulfillment of the terms of the trust becomes
"impossible or impracticable or illegal to carry out. "64 Equity will
not allow a charitable trust to fail,65 and the court will try to apply
the trust to "some other charitable purpose that falls within the
general charitable intention of the settlor."66 Since the donor's con
trol ends at the time the trust is created, the court does not have to
take into consideration the donor's wishes while he is living,
although the court "undoubtedly" wil1. 67 Generally, state law de
termines whether a court will apply cy pres to the trust at issue. 68
62. See Andrew C. Kruger, Note, Are Charitable Trusts and the Doctrine of Cy
Pres Alive After Yale University v. Blumenthal?, 8 CONN. PROB. L.J. 241, 248 nn.43 &
45 (1994). Cy pres comes from the phrase in Norman French cy pres comme possible,
which means "as near as possible." See In re Estate of Buck, No. 23259 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Aug. 15, 1986), reprinted in 21 U.S.F. L. REv. 691, 747 (1987) (citing BOGERT & Bo·
GERT, supra note 43, § 431, at 490). The doctrine of cy pres is set out in the RESTATE
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959). The text is as follows:
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose,
and it is or becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to carry out the
particular purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more general intention to
devote the property to charitable purposes, the trust will not fail but the court
will direct the application of the property to some charitable purpose which
falls within the general charitable intention of the settlor.
[d.
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 cmt. a (1959).
64. 4A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 32, § 367.2, at 118. Some examples of
when a charitable trust can fail are when the amount given is insufficient to accomplish
the purpose, the particular purpose is already accomplished, lack of consent, the pur
pose has no value to the community, or illegality. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 399 cmts. jon (1959).
65. See Kruger, supra note 62, at 251. This is because, at least in Connecticut, the
courts assume that the "donor would attach so much more importance to the object of
the gift than to the mechanism." /d. (quoting Briggs v. Merchants Nat'! Bank, 81
N.E.2d 827, 834 (Mass. 1948».
66. 4A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 32, § 367.2, at 118; see also RESTATE
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 cmt. d (1959).
A settlor is a donor or person who creates a trust. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 3 (1959). Just because a trust fails does not mean that the court will find that
the donor had a general charitable intent. In Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970),
property which was conveyed in a will to the city of Macon, Georgia to create a whites
only park was allowed to fail because there was no general charitable intent. See id. at
441-43; see also Kruger, supra note 62, at 252.
67. 4A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 32, § 367.2, at 118.
68. See Kruger, supra note 62, at 252. Connecticut applies a three part test when
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The trustees of the charitable trust are not allowed to decide
whether or not to devote the property of the failed trust to some
other general charitable purpose, even if that purpose falls within
the intent of the donor. 69 Instead, the trustees must apply to the
court for a determination of the donor's charitable intention; thus,
the court decides where to apply the failed trust.1 o If the trustees
do not apply for court approval, they "are subject to liability for
breach of truSt."71
B.

Standing Under Connecticut Law

In order to commence a lawsuit, a plaintiff must be a proper
party to bring the suit; this is known as standing. 72 According to the
Connecticut Supreme Court, standing is a "practical concept
designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits
brought to vindicate non-justiciable interests and that judicial deci
sions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot contro
versy with each view fairly and vigorously represented. "73 Courts
decide that the requirements of justiciability and controversy are
"met when a complainant makes a colorable claim of direct injury
he has suffered or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representa
tive capacity."74 A plaintiff cannot have standing "unless he has ...
some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable
deciding whether to apply cy pres: (1) the trust must have a charitable purpose, (2) the
specific charitable purpose must be "impossible, impracticable, or illegal," and (3) "the
settlor must have manifested a general" charitable intent. Hartford Hosp. v. Blumen
thal, No. CV-95-0555462-S, 1996 WL 240440, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 15, 1996).
The third part of the test is interpreted to mean that the actual organization to which
the donation is made is secondary to the general charitable intent. See id.
69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 cmt. e (1959).
70. See id.
71. Id. The court can, however, retroactively approve the action of the trustees
"as though the court had authorized the application [of the failed gift] before it was
made." Id. Cy Pres is addressed in section 45a-533(d) of the General Statutes of Con
necticut. See infra note 102 for the text of section 45a-533(d).
72. See Nye v. Marcus, 502 A.2d 869, 871 (Conn. 1985).
73. Gay & Lesbian Law Students Ass'n at the Univ. of Conn. Sch. of Law v.
Board of Trustees, Univ. of Conn., 673 A.2d 484, 490 (Conn. 1996) (citing Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186,204 (1962); Stern v. Stern, 332 A.2d 78, 80 (Conn. 1973); Maloney v.
Pac, 439 A.2d 349, 354 (Conn. 1981». In the Gay & Lesbian Law Students case, the
University of Connecticut law school's gay and lesbian student organization sought a
permanent injunction to prevent the school from permitting the military to recruit on
campus. See id. at 486-87. The court granted the organization standing to sue based on
a Connecticut statute which prohibits discrimination against homosexuals. See id. 491
92.
74. Id. at 490 (citing Maloney, 439 A.2d at 354).
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right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy."75
One must merely allege injury or "attempt to vindicate 'arguably'
protected interests" in order to have standing. 76
When a claim arises by operation of a statute, the Connecticut
Supreme Court uses a two part "aggrievement" test to determine
whether a plaintiff has a statutory right to sue.77 First, the plaintiff
"must successfully demonstrate a specific personal and legal inter
est in the subject matter."78 Second, following the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,79 the
plaintiff must show that he has been injured and that the injury
75.
1994».

Id. at 491 (quoting Presidential Capital Corp. v. Reale, 652 A.2d 489 (Conn.

76. Id. at 491 (quoting Maloney, 439 A.2d at 354 n.6 (citing Ducharme v. Putnam,
285 A.2d 318, 320 (Conn. 1971); Association of Data Processing Servo Orgs., Inc. V.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970))).
In federal cases, the requirement to show injury is the first of three factors that a
plaintiff must satisfy in order to have standing under Article Ill's case and controversy
provision. See Valley Forge Christian College V. Americans United for the Separation
of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1982). The other factors of the test are that
the defendant must have caused the injury and that the court must be able to redress
the injury. See id. See infra note 79 and accompanying text for a full discussion of this
test as outlined in Lujan V. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
77. Med-Trans of Conn., Inc. V. Department of Pub. Health and Addiction Servs.,
699 A.2d 142, 146 (Conn. 1997).
78. Id. A specific interest must be more than a general interest. A general inter
est is an interest which "is the concern of all members of the community as a whole."
Id. at 146 (quoting United Cable Television Servs. Corp. V. Department of Pub. Util.
Control, 663 A.2d 1011, 1017 (Conn. 1995».
79. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). In Gay & Lesbian Law Students Ass'n at the University
of Connecticut School of Law V. Board of Trustees, University of Connecticut, 673 A.2d
484 (Conn. 1996), the Connecticut Supreme Court endorsed the standing analysis con
tained in Lujan, stating "[t]here is little material difference between what we have re
quired and what the United States Supreme Court ... demanded of the plaintiff to
establish standing." Id. at 4~1 n.lO.
Lujan added to a line of United States Supreme Court cases about standing and
contained a three prong test. First, the complainant must demonstrate an "injury in
fact." This means that the plaintiff must have a "concrete and particularized [injury] ...
[which is] actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560
61. Second, the injury must be caused by the defendant's actions, rather than by an
other party. See id. Third, it must be likely, rather than speCUlative, that a favorable
decision will grant relief from the injury. See id. at 561; see also Gay & Lesbian Law
Students, 673 A.2d at 490-91; Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall Kelso, Standing to Sue:
Transformations in Supreme Court Methodology, Doctrine and Results, 28 U. ToL. L.
REv. 93, 97-148 (1996) (arguing that Supreme Court's standing doctrine can be under
stood as reflecting changes in Court personnel and decision making styles of Justices).
See generally Allen V. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (articulating, for the first time,
the three prong test for standing); Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 489-90
(denying taxpayer standing).
'!\vo recent Supreme Court cases which discuss standing under operation of a stat
ute, Bennett V. Spear, 504 U.S. 154 (1997), and National Credit Union Administration V.
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"falls within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the stat
utory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for [the] com
plaint."80 The zone of interests portion of the aggrievement test is
part of standing, which is a "set of prudential principles" the judici
ary uses to limit its power to hear cases. 81 The Connecticut
Supreme Court looks to the language of the statute and to legisla
tive intent to define the zone of interests. 82
Courts may confer standing on a plaintiff when the statute does
not explicitly grant a right to sue; this is known as a statutory im
plied private right of action. 83 Connecticut courts use implied priFirst National Bank & Trust Company, 118 S. Ct. 927 (1998), are discussed in detail
infra Part III.
80. Med-Trans, 699 A.2d at 146 (quoting United Cable Television, 663 A.2d at
1018 (quoting Air Courier Conference v. Postal Workers, 498 U.S. 517, 523 (1991) (cit
ing Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 873 (1990»». In Med-Trans, the
Connecticut Public Health and Addiction Services department decided to grant a li
cense to an emergency ambulance service. Another ambulance service which, until
then, had a monopoly on the service, appealed the decision. The court held that the
claimant ambulance service lacked standing under the licensing statute because it did
not fall within the zone of interests protected by the statute. See id. at 147-51.
The zone of interests component of standing analysis was articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) (finding that Congress did not intend to allow suit by
every person suffering injury in fact when it passed the Administration Procedure Act).
See Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 475 (quoting Association of Data
Processing Servo Orgs., Inc. V. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970»; Mary A. Renfer & Douglas
C. Smith, Note, Kapiolani Park Preservation Society V. City and County of Honolulu:
The Lease of Public Park Land as a Breach of a Charitable Trust, 11 U. HAw. L. REv.
199,213-14 (1989) (discussing requirements of standing).
81. Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 474. Under prudential standing,
even if a plaintiff can show injury caused by actions of the defendant, which are
redressable in court, standing may be denied under certain conditions. First, the plain
tiff must be asserting his own legal rights or interests rather than those of third parties.
Second, even if the plaintiff has a redressable injury, the court will not hear a case if the
injury is based on an abstract question or an issue that is better addressed by the other
branches of government. Third, the plaintiff's "complaint [must] fall within.'the zone of
interests [that are] protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee.'"
Id. at 475 (quoting Association of Data Processing Servs., 397 U.S. at 153); see also
William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988) (arguing that
the standing doctrine should be abandoned in favor of deciding standing on the merits
of plaintiff's claim); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? of Citizen Suits,
"Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992) (critiquing current conceptions
of standing doctrine); Kelso & Kelso, supra note 79; Renfer & Smith, supra note 80.
82. See Med-Trans, 699 A.2d at 149-50. See supra Part I.C and infra Parts II-III
for a discussion of the fact that there is no legislative history to CUMIFA that explicitly
covers donor standing under the statute. See infra Part III.B.3 for a discussion of Na
tional Credit Union Administration V. First National Bank & Trust Co., 118 S. Ct. 927
(1998), where the Supreme Court rejected the search for legislative intent in the zone of
interests analysis.
83. In Bennett V. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997), the Supreme Court stated that the
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vate rights of action as part of their analysis of the statutory right to
sue. 84 In Mead v. Burns,85 for example, the Connecticut Supreme
Court found an implied private right of action under the Connecti
cut Unfair Trade Practices Act ("CUTPA").86 "[S]everal factors
are relevant" in determining whether a private right of action can
be implied under a statute. 87 These factors are derived from a test
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash. 88
First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose . . . benefit the
statute was enacted ... ? Second, is there any indication of legis
zone of interests analysis is part of standing analysis unless Congress expressly forbids it
in the statute. See id. at 163. Bennett is discussed fully infra Part III.
When a statute explicitly grants standing to particular individuals, this is also
known as conferring a private right of action. The focus of this Note is a statute which
does not explicitly do so. C/. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404
U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (finding implied private right of action under section 1O(b)-5 of the
Securities Exchange Act ("SEA") of 1934,15 U.S.c. § 78j(b) (1994), when fraud is used
in sale or purchase of securities); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964) (im
plying a private right of action under section 14(a) of the SEA, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)
(1994), because SEA implies availability of judicial relief to achieve the purpose of the
statute). This is sometimes known as the private attorney general. See Bennett, 520
U.S. at 165. However, many courts use the term "private attorney general" when they
are discussing whether or not the plaintiff will be awarded attorney's fees. See, e.g.,
Doe v. Heintz, 526 A.2d 1318, 1322 (Conn. 1987).
84. See, e.g., Napoletano v. Cigna He~lthcare, Inc., 680 A.2d 127, 145 (Conn.
1996); Mead v. Bums, 509 A.2d 11 (Conn. 1986); Town of Willington v. Regional Bd. of
Educ., No. CV-95-57652-S, 1997 WL 663100, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1997).
85. 509 A.2d 11 (Conn. 1986).
86. See id. at 18.
87. Town o/Willington, 1997 WL 663100, at *4 (quoting Napoletano, 680 A.2d at
145).
In Town 0/ Willington, in 1993, the town joined a regional school district estab
lished by two other towns, Ashford and Mansfield. See id. at *1. Willington paid the
school district to educate its students. See id. at *2. At the end of the 1993-94 fiscal
year, the school had a surplus in its budget and the regional board of education voted to
return the money to the budgets of Ashford and Mansfield. See id. The Town of Wil
lington sued, claiming that the decision to return the surplus money to the other two
towns violated section 10-51(c) of the General Statutes of Connecticut, which said that
any surplus should be applied to the next year's school budget. See id. at *3. Among
other things, the defendants claimed that Willington did not have a private right of
action under section 1O-51(c). See id. The Connecticut court applied the three factors
derived from Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), and denied a cause of action to Wil
lington. See Town 0/ Willington, 1997 WL 663100, at *4-6.
88. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In Cort, the stockholders of the Bethlehem Steel Corpo
ration tried to get an injunction against the corporate directors who were using corpo
rate funds to pay for advertisements in the 1972 presidential election. Although he was
not mentioned by name, the ads targeted Senator George McGovern, the nominee for
the Democratic party. The stockholders argued that 18 U.S.c. § 610, which prohibited
corporations from making contributions and expenditures to federal elections, gave
them an implied private right of action to sue to stop the funding of the advertisements.
The court disagreed and found no implied private right of action. See id.
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lative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or
to deny one? ... Third, is it consistent with the underlying pur
poses of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
plaintiff?89

C.

The Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act
("UMIFA") and the Connecticut Uniform Management
of Institutional Funds Act ("CUMIFA")
1. Purpose of UMIFA and CUMIFA

UMIFA and CUMIFA were designed to bring changes to the
common law governing charitable institutions. 90 The drafters of
UMIFA considered changes necessary because, traditionally, col
leges and universities had relied on funds generated from the in
vestment of endowment funds to supplement the money they
received from tuition. 91 The college or university had to go to court
if it wanted to change a gift restriction. 92
Largely as a result of a 19th century Massachusetts case,93
courts held trustees of charitable institutions to a "prudent man"
standard when they invested endowment funds. 94 Through subse
quent decisions, courts narrowed the rule to a very stringent stan
89. Napoletano, 680 A.2d at 144-45 (quoting Cart, 422 U.S. at 78) (alterations in
original); see also Town of Willington, 1997 WL 663100, at *3.
90. The titles of the sections of CUMIFA are as follows:
45a-526. Short Title: Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act.
45a-527. Definitions.
45a-528. Expenditure of net appreciation, standards.
45a-529. Exception and restriction on expenditure of net appreciation.
Construction.
45a-529a. Accumulation of annual net income, standards.
45a-529b. Exception and restriction on accumulation of annual net income.
Construction.
45a-530. Investment of institutional funds.
45a-531. Delegation of powers of investment.
45a-532. Standards applicable to actions of governing board.
45a-533. Release of restriction in gift instrument: Written consent, court order.
Limitations. Doctrine of cy pres applicable.
45a-534. Construction.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45a-526 to -534 (1997).
91. See Salaway, supra note 3, at 1045-46.
92. See supra Part I.A.4 for a discussion of cy pres, the common law process for
changing restrictions on charitable gifts.
93. See Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
94. See Salaway, supra note 3, at 1053 (citing Harvard College v. Amory, 26
Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830)). The "prudent man" standard meant that while trustees
could invest funds, they could not do so speculatively, but had to consider "the prob
able income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested." Id. at 1054. If
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dard which "hampered the investment choices of trustees."95 As a
result, trustees followed a conservative strategy, investing in "safe"
government bonds, and high dividend stocks rather than growth
stocks. 96
The investment strategy worked until the late 1960s, when in
flation, low enrollment, and a drop in the stock market caused col
leges to suffer financially.97 In the late 1960s, the Ford Foundation
commissioned a study "to examine the legal restrictions on the
powers of trustees ... of colleges and universities to invest endow
ment funds to achieve growth, to maintain purchasing power, and
to expend a prudent portion of appreciation in endowment funds.
They concluded that . . . the legal impediments . . . [were] more
legendary than real."98 As a result of the study, the Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws introduced UMIFA in 1972. 99
The purpose of UMIFA was to allow trustees of charitable in
stitutions, including colleges and universities, to invest more liber
ally in order to obtain higher yields. UMIFA offered a trustee
(1) a standard of prudent use of appreciation in invested funds;
(2) specific investment authority; (3) authority to delegate invest
ment decisions; (4) a standard of business care and prudence to
guide governing boards in the exercise of their duties under the
Act; and (5) a method of releasing restrictions on the use of
funds or selection of investments by donor acquiescence or court
action.lOO
What UMIFA has meant in practice is that the standard of care for
the trustees is less stringent than before, going from prudent man to
business prudence, and colleges and universities are now more free
to choose higher risk investments with higher returns. lOl In addi
the trustee did not invest prudently, the trustee was liable for breach of trust. See
Daugherty, supra note 1, at 322.
95. Salaway, supra note 3, at 1054.
96. See id. Institutions would spend the money from the income on the endow
ment but leave the principal intact. See id.
97. See Daugherty, supra note 1, at 319.
98. UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS Acr Prefatory Note, 7A Part
II U.L.A. 477 (1999).
99. See Sal away, supra note 3, at 1057. See supra note 23 and accompanying text
for a discussion of which states have adopted UMIFA.
100. UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS Acr Prefatory Note, 7A
Part II U.L.A. 476 (1999).
101. See Salaway, supra note 3, at 1056. Some examples of the new kinds of
investments are venture capital, derivatives, and hedge funds. See id. at 1046.
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tion, it offers trustees a mechanism for altering gift restrictions with
out having to incur court costs.
2.

Section 45a-533 of CUMIFA (Section 7 of UMIFA)

In 1973, Connecticut adopted CUMIFA, its version of UMIFA.
CUMIFA provides charitable institutions with a scheme for altering
restrictions on gifts through section 45a-533. 102 Section 45a-533
does not explicitly confer a right to sue to enforce gift restrictions
on donors. Section 45a-533(a) states that a restriction on a gift may
be altered by "the written consent of the donor."lo3 Section 45a
533(b) provides for a judicial ruling on the restriction if the donor is
dead, disabled, unavailable, or impossible to identify.l04 Section
45a-533( c) states that releases from restrictions will be allowed only
if the money is to be used for educational or other charitable pur
poses. lOS Section45a-533(d) states that sections (a) through (c) do
not limit the application of cy pres. 106 Accordingly, the court may
determine the intent of the donor and require that the money be
spent in close approximation to that intent. 107
Although section 45a-533 does not confer donor standing to
sue, the language of section 45a-533(a) significantly alters the com
102. Section 4Sa-S33 of CUMIFA is identical to section 7 of UMIFA. The text of
section 4Sa-S33 is as follows:
(a) With the written consent of the donor, the governing board may release, in
whole or in part, a restriction imposed by the applicable gift instrument on the
use or investment of an institutional fund.
(b) If written consent of the donor cannot be obtained by reason of his death,
disability, unavailability or impossibility of identification, the governing board
may apply, in the name of the institution, to the Superior Court for a judicial
district in which the institution conducts its affairs for release of a restriction
imposed by the applicable gift instrument on the use or investment of an insti
tutional fund. The Attorney General shall be notified of the application and
shall be given an opportunity to be heard. If the court finds that the restriction
is obsolete, inappropriate or impracticable, it may by order release the restric
tion in whole or in part. A release under this subsection may not change an
endowment fund to a fund that is not an endowment fund:
(c) A release under this section may not allow a fund to be used for purposes
other than educational, religious, charitable or other eleemosynary purposes
of the institution affected.
(d) This section does not limit the application of cy pres or approximation.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4Sa-S33 (1997).
103. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4Sa-S33(a) (1997).
104. See id. § 4Sa-S33(b).
lOS. See id. § 4Sa-S33(c).
106. See id. § 4Sa-S33(d).
107. Cf. id. § 4Sa-S33(d). See supra Part I.A.4 for a discussion of the common
law doctrine of cy pres.
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mon law.108 Under common law, once a gift was completed, a do
nor had no power to consent to changes in gift restrictions.109
Instead, donees had to obtain court permission through the use of
cy pres. Section 45a-533(a) of CUMIFA allows gift restrictions to
be modified solely through the consent of the donor. CUMIFA
gives legal force to donor consent, something that did not exist at
common law.
3.

The National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform
State Laws' Notes to UMIFA

The National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State
Laws provided notes to UMIFA. The notes have two main parts, a
"Prefatory Note," which is an overview of the entire Act, including
some commentary about each of UMIFA's sections, and a "Com
ment" provision, which corresponds to each of UMIFA's sec
tions.n° The Prefatory Note to UMIFA contains an initial
discussion of both the problem with investing that charitable insti
tutions were facing and the Ford Foundation study.111 In addition,
part of the Prefatory Note addresses section 7 of UMIFA.112 It
states that while donors are allowed by law to place restrictions on
gifts, UMIFA provides a mechanism to obtain the donor's acquies
cence in the face of "outmoded or wasteful or unworkable"
restrictions.113
UMIFA's Comment to section 7 also is very brief.114 It states
that while the donor retains no property interest in a completed
108. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-533(a) (1997), with the discussion of com
mon law principles supra Part LA.
109. See supra Part LA for a discussion of the common law of charitable trusts.
110. See UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS Aer, 7A Part II V.L.A.
475 (1999).
111. See supra Part Le.1 for a discussion of the statute's purpose.
112. See UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS Aer Prefatory Note, 7A
Part II V.L.A. 479 (1999).
113. Id. The text of the Prefatory Note's reference to Section 7 of VMIFA states:
It is established law that the donor may place restrictions on his largess which
the donee institution must honor. Too often, the restrictions on the use or
investment become outmoded or wasteful or unworkable. There is a need for
review of obsolete restrictions and a way of modifying or adjusting them. The
Act authorizes the governing board to obtain the acquiescence of the donor to
a release of restrictions and, in the absence of the donor, to petition the appro
priate court for relief in appropriate [circumstances].
Id.
114. See VNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS Aer § 7 cmt., 7A Part II
V.L.A. 503-04 (1999).
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gift, his restrictions control. 115 Because use of the common law doc
trine of cy pres had not always been helpful in dealing with donor
restrictions, UMIFA allows the institution to obtain a release from
those restrictions. 116 No federal tax problems were anticipated by
having the donor consent to such a release, because the donor did
not have the right to enforce the restriction; the donor could only
acquiesce in lessening it. 117
4.

Legislative History of CUMIFA

Connecticut enacted its version of UMIFA in 1973. Like the
committee notes to UMIFA, the legislative history of CUMIFA
does not directly address a donor's right to sue in order to enforce
gift restrictions. During the hearings on CUMIFA, all of the discus
sion in the legislature centered on investment advantages for chari
table institutions.1 18 The Connecticut legislature'S judiciary
Committee heard endorsements of the law from Lewis Hyde, the
Executive Director of the Connecticut Conference of Independent
Colleges, John Tilson, counsel for both the Connecticut Hospital
Association and the Connecticut Association of Independent
Schools, and Alan N. Houghton, Headmaster of the Hotchkiss
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. The text of the Comment to section 7 of UMIFA provides the
following:
There should be an expeditious way to make necessary adjustments when the
restrictions [on gifts] no longer serve the original purpose. Cy pres has not
been a satisfactory answer and is reluctantly applied in some states ....
This section permits a release of limitations that imperil efficient adminis
tration of a fund or prevent sound investment management if the governing
board can secure the approval of the donor or the appropriate court.
Although the donor has no property interest in a fund after the gift, none
theless if it is the donor's limitation that controls the governing board and he
or she agrees that the restriction need not apply, the board should be free of
the burden ....
If the donor is unable to consent or cannot be identified, the appropriate
court may upon application ... release a limitation which is obsolete, inappro
priate, or impracticable... .
No federal tax problems for the donor are anticipated by permitting re
lease of a restriction. The donor has no right to enforce the restriction, no inter
est in the fund and no power to change the eleemosynary beneficiary of the
fund. He may only acquiesce in a lessening of a restriction already in effect.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 367, 381, 399 (1959); 4 AUSTIN
WAKEMAN SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 399, at 3084, § 399.4, at 3119, § 367.3, at 2846
(3d. ed. 1967» (emphasis added).
118. See generally House Proceeding, supra note 12; UMIFA Hearing, supra note
12.
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School. 119
The only other record of discussion is from the House Proceed
ings of May 9, 1973, where several representatives spoke in support
of the bill. 120 Representative Bingham said that the bill would al
Iowa rational solution to the problem of making "effective use of
endowment and other investment funds."121 Representative Neid
itz endorsed the bill because he saw it as a way to help charitable
institutions better manage their endowments. 122 He said that
UMIFA was drafted by experts123 and was
carefully worded-the bill contains carefully worded safeguards
intended to protect the public interest and the charitable endow
ments. The bill generally leaves it to the donor to make his own
provisions for the matters covered in the bill. The bill applies
when the donor has not specified another way. The matter of
putting charitable [institutions] in a position to get the best total
return is particularly important. 124

Representative Demerell voiced fear that the bill was dangerous
because schools did not have investing expertise and, consequently,
might make mistakes which would cost them more in the long
run. 125 Representative Healey said that Representative Demerell's
fears were misplaced because the investment standard of care im
posed on schools would require them to take into account long
term risks. 126 In addition, he said "if the donor has seen fit to spell
out restrictions, then those restrictions govern. This bill steps in
only in the event that he has not spelled out the restrictions."127
119. See UMIFA Hearing, supra note 12, at 337, 338, 349, 350. Mr. Hyde ex
plained that colleges in Connecticut needed to be investing in such a way as to account
for inflation. See id. at 337. He also briefly explained the provisions of CUMIFA. See
id. Mr. Tilson said that other kinds of schools have the same problems with endow
ments that colleges have. See id. at 338. Mr. Houghton submitted his endorsement in
the form of a letter which was read into the record by Mr. Olson. See id. at 349. The
letter stated that CUMIFA would go a long way toward freeing up monies from endow
ment for investing in a way that was appropriate for the modern economy. See id. at
350.
120. The Connecticut Senate passed the bill on the consent calendar on May 16,
1973, without commentary. See 16 S. Proc., Pt. 8, 1973 Sess., at 3865 (Conn.). The bill
passed the House by a vote of 140 for, and 1 against, with 10 either absent or not voting.
See House Proceeding, supra note 12, at 5736.
121. House Proceeding, supra note 12, at 5723.
122. See id. at 5724.
123. See id. at 5725.
124. Id. at 5725-26.
125. See id. at 5727-29.
126. See id. at 5731-32.
127. Id.
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Representative Dooley supported the bill because "those en
trusted with endowment funds with the passage of this bill will no
longer have to rely on case law to govern their actions."128 Repre
sentative Bevacqua supported the bill because he believed that de
ceased donors would have acquiesced in changing restrictions on
their gifts to accommodate their original intent.129 He echoed the
belief of Representative Webber that releasing restrictions would
bring about more scholarships for students. 130
The issue of a donor's right to sue if a donee violates section
45a-533(a) is not addressed directly by the express language of
UMIFA or CUMIFA, the notes to UMIFA, or the legislative his
tory of CUMIFA. That issue arose for the first time in 1991, in Carl
J. Herzog Foundation, Inc. v. University of Bridgeportpl
II.

CARL

J

HERZOG FOUNDATION, INC V. UNIVERSITY
OF BRIDGEPORT

A.

Facts

The plaintiff, Carl J. Herzog Foundation, Inc. ("Foundation"),
agreed, on August 12, 1986, to participate in a matching grant pro
gram with the University of Bridgeport ("University"), a private
institutionP2 If the University raised funds, the Foundation would
match the amount, up to $250,000. 133 The money was to "'provide
need-based merit scholarship aid to disadvantaged students for
medical related education."'134 The University wrote a letter on
September 9,1986, accepting the Foundation's offerP5 By June 28,
128. Id. at 5732-33.
129. See id. at 5733-35.
130. See id.
131. No. CV-94-0137902-S, 1995 WL 128255, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 17,
1995), rev'd, 677 A.2d 1378 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996), rev'd, 699 A.2d 995 (Conn. 1997).
132. See Herzog, 677 A.2d at 1379. Since 1992, the University of Bridgeport has
been controlled by "an affiliate of the Reverend Sun Myung Moon's Unification
Church." See Rabinovitz, supra note 19, at B1.
The University of Bridgeport was the defendant in a suit filed by a "life trustee" of
the University challenging the decision by the University's voting trustees to grant the
Reverend Moon's affiliate, the Professor's World Peace Academy, the right to nomi
nate sixty percent of the members of the board of trustees in exchange for a $50.5
million loan. See Steeneck v. University of Bridgeport, 668 A.2d 688, 690 (Conn. 1995).
The life trustee sued on the grounds that the vote violated the charter of the University
by turning it into a sectarian institution. See id. The Connecticut Supreme Court, rely
ing on common law, ruled that the life trustee did not have standing to sue. See id. at
696.
133. See Herzog, 677 A.2d at 1380.
134. Id. at 1379 (quoting the Foundation's Complaint).
135. See id. at 1379-80.
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1988, the University had raised its share of the money and the
Foundation made its final grant of money.136 The money went to
scholarships for the University's nursing program.137
On June 20, 1991, the University closed its nursing program,
but did not inform the Foundation until November 21,1991.138 The
University did not request the Foundation's written consent to re
lease the money for other purposes, nor did it apply to the court for
a release as required by sections 45a-533(a) or (d) of CUMIFA.13 9
The Foundation filed suit alleging that the funds were no longer
being used for their specified purpose and that, instead, the funds
were commingled with the University's general funds in violation of
sections 45a-527(1) and (2) of the General Statutes of Connecti
cut.140 The Foundation requested a temporary and permanent in
junction ordering the University to segregate the $250,000, account
for its use, and to spend the monies only for the purposes to which
the Foundation had agreed. If the purposes of the gift could not be
fulfilled, the Foundation wanted the University to give the money
back.141
The Foundation relied upon section 45a-533(a) to claim a right
to sue. 142 The Foundation's reasoning was that, by allowing the
written consent of the donor to alter gift restrictions, the statute
created a right to sue. 143 The University relied upon the Comments
to section 7 of UMIFA144 to claim that donors have no right of en
forcement because they have no property interest in completed
136. See id. at 1380.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id. See supra note 102 for the text of section 45a-533 of the General
Statutes of Connecticut.
140. See Herzog, 677 A.2d at 1380. Sections 45a-527(1) and (2) define institution
and institutional fund, respectively. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-527 (1997). Since this
case was dismissed for lack of standing to sue, it is not clear from the cases where the
University actually put the money it received from the Foundation. It also is not clear
whether the University has other medical related programs where it could use the
money.
141. See Herzog, 677 A.2d at 1380. See infra Part III.B.3.c for a discussion of this
Note's suggestion that standing be limited, which would not allow the Foundation to
take the money back. The suggestion that standing be limited addresses the tax con
cerns that the supreme court raised. See infra Part II.B.3 for a discussion of the Con
necticut Supreme Court's holding.
142. See Herzog, 677 A.2d at 1381-82. See supra Part I.C for a discussion of the
statute, and supra note 102 for the text of section 45a-533(a) of the General Statutes of
Connecticut.
143. See Herzog, 677 A.2d at 1381.
144. See id. at 1383. See supra note 117 for the Comment to section 7 of UMIFA.
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charitable giftS. 145 Instead, the University argued that only the At
torney General has the right to sue to enforce gift restrictions. 146

B.

The Reasoning of the Connecticut Courts
1.

Connecticut Superior Court

The trial court granted a motion to dismiss the case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.147 The court held that the Foundation
did not have standing under CUMIFA because the statute does not
give the donor the right to enforce gift restrictions. 148 The court
read the Comment to section 7 of UMIFA149 and stated that
CUMIFA gave" 'no property interest'" to the donor. 150 The court
noted that sometimes donors have been granted standing if "'the
gift is conditional or ineffective, or there is a clear reservation of
right to terminate or revoke it."'151 Because the Foundation did not
reserve its rights, the court relied on common law and said that only
the Attorney General may bring suit. 152 The court ended its analy
sis by quoting from section 3-125 of the General Statutes of Con
necticut, which explicitly states that the Attorney General
represents the public interest in protecting charitable gifts. 153 The
Foundation appealed. 154
2.

Connecticut Appellate Court

The appellate court reversed the trial court. 155 The appellate
145. See Herzog, 677 A.2d at 1383-84. See supra Part I.C.2 for a discussion of
section 7 of UMIFA.
146. See Herzog, 677 A.2d at 1384. See supra Part I.A.2 for a discussion of en
forcing charitable gifts.
147. See Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, No. CV-94
0137902-S, 1995 WL 128255, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 17, 1995), rev'd, 677 A.2d
1378 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996), rev'd, 699 A.2d 995 (Conn. 1997).
148. See id. at *3.
149. See supra note 117 for the text of the Comment to section 7 of UMIFA.
150. Herzog, 1995 WL 128255, at *2 (quoting UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSlITU·
TIONAL FUNDS Acr § 7 cmt., 7A U.L.A. 724 (1985».
151. Id. (quoting 15 AM. JUR. 2D Charities § 148, at 175-76 (1976».
152. See id. at *3. The court said that the reason the Attorney General is put in
charge of lawsuits is that once a gift is given to a charity the use of funds are matters of
public, not private concern. See id. (citing Steeneck v. University of Bridgeport, 668
A.2d 688, 696 (Conn. 1995); 15 AM. JUR. 2D Charities § 148, at 175-76 (1976».
153. See id. Section 3-125 of the General Statutes of Connecticut identifies "gifts,
legacies or devises" as charitable gifts. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-125 (1997).
154. See Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 682 A.2d 998
(Conn. 1996) (granting certification of Herzog's appeal).
155. See Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 677 A.2d 1378,
1385 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996), rev'd, 699 A.2d 995 (Conn. 1997). The dissent, however,
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court held that section 45a-533(a) of CUMIFA, which allows the
written consent of the donor to alter restrictions on gifts, gave the
Foundation standing. 156 The court ruled that the statute creates a
donor's right beyond common law because "[i]t would be anoma
lous for a statute to provide for written consent by a donor to
change a restriction and then deny that donor access to the courts
to complain of a change without such consent. "157 The court relied
on statutory interpretation and common law to make its ruling. 15S
The appellate court began its analysis with a discussion of the
issue of standing. 159 The court noted that standing is granted to
those who have a "real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or
equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the contro
versy."160 The court further noted that standing is conferred either
by statute or by being "classically aggrieved."161 The appellate
court held that the Foundation had standing to bring suit because
standing could be fairly implied in the statute. 162 The court stated
that there was no need to have a specific provision in a statute. 163
The court found the implication for standing in CUMIFA be
cause the statute requires a gift recipient to obtain the written con
sent of the donor in order to release restrictions on a gift. l64 Since a
donor's right to consent to release a gift restriction did not exist at
common law, the court reasoned that this was a statutorily created
right to grant or withhold consent. 165 Further, the court agreed
endorsed the reasoning of the appellate court. See id. at 1002 (McDonald, J., dissent
ing). See infra Part n.B.3.b for a discussion of the dissent in the supreme court's
decision.
156. See Herzog, 677 A.2d at 1380-81.
157. Id. at 1385.
158. See id. at 1381-85.
159. See id. at 1380-81.
160. Id. at 1381. Standing is "a practical concept designed to ensure that courts
and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that
judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy."
Id. (citing Unisys Corp. v. Department of Labor, 600 A.2d 1019, 1022 (Conn. 1991)).
161. Id. (citing Steeneck v. University of Bridgeport, 668 A.2d 688, 692 (Conn.
1995)). The court stated that since the Foundation was relying on the statute for stand
ing, it would not analyze whether the Foundation was classically aggrieved. See id. at
1381 n.2. Further, the court said that the issue of standing is different than a legal
interest. A legal interest concerns the merits of the case. See id. at 1381.
162. See id. at 1381, 1385.
163. See id. at 1381 (citing Bucholz's Appeal from Probate, 519 A.2d 615, 620-21
(Conn. App. Ct. 1987)). The court said that standing could be implied because the
question of standing is only whether the interest the person is trying to protect "is ar
guably within the zone of interests" protected by the statute. Id.
164. See id. at 1385.
165. See id. at 1381-82.
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with the Foundation's argument that, if the donor could not enforce
subsection 45a-533(a), the statute itself would be rendered
meaningless. 166
The appellate court next examined the legislative intent of
CUMIFA.167 The court noted the Connecticut legislature intended
to create a means for colleges to "seek a release" of gift restrictions
from donors directly and that CUMIFA would allow more freedom
to use their endowments. 168 However, the court noted "that the
right championed by the plaintiff, namely, a statutory interest in a
completed gift that is sufficient to require [the donor's] consent, ...
is not inconsistent with the statutory right of a donee to obtain a
release of a" gift restriction. 169
The court then turned to the official comments in UMIFA.170
The court noted the comments show that the drafters' purpose was
to have sections 45a-526 to 45a-534 read together, so as to make
uniform law.1 71 The court went on to state that the main purpose of
UMIFA is to provide a mechanism whereby, with donor consent, a
charitable institution can modify obsolete restrictions. l72 The court
stated that written consent is required because donors have the
right to place restrictions on gifts. 173
The court then addressed the two arguments raised by the Uni
versity, both of which relied on the Comment to section 7 of
UMIFA. First, the University posited that the Comment states that
donors have no enforcement right in a completed giftY4 The court
dismissed this argument by noting that the Comment was made ex
plicitly in response to tax implications of a donor releasing a gift
restriction and did not apply to enforcing the restrictions them
selves. 175 Second, the University claimed that only the Attorney
General can enforce restrictions on a completed gift because do
166. See id. at 1382.
167. See id.
168. Id. To support its statement, the court offered quotations from Connecticut
state legislators. See id. at 1382 n.4 ("This bill ... aid[s] charitable corporations ... in
the better management of their endowments ....").
169. Id. at 1382.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 1383 (citing Yale Univ. v. Blumenthal, 621 A.2d 1304, 1307 (Conn.
1993)).
172. See id. (citing UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS Acr Prefatory
Note, 7A U.L.A. 706 (1985)).
173. See id.
174. See id. at 1382. See supra note 117 for the text of the Comment to section 7
of UMIFA.
175. See Herzog, 677 A.2d at 1383.
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nors have no property interest in the gift. 176 The court conceded
that the Comment states specifically that no property interest is cre
ated in a gifU77 However, the court pointed out that "it does not
follow that no protect able statutory interest exists for the purpose
of standing."178 Instead, the court said that the statute created a
protect able interest in the donor which can be enforced by individu
als other than the Attorney GeneralP9
The court built upon the University's argument that common
law applied to this case. It pointed out that even under the com
mon law of trusts, "[o]thers [besides the Attorney General] may ...
have standing to enforce charitable trusts, such as trustees, donors
of gifts and heirs and executors of wills, which standing includes the
right to bring actions or to intervene in actions brought to enforce
provisions of trusts or WillS."180 The appellate court justified its
finding that CUMIFA contained an implied right to standing by cit
ing Buchholz's Appeal from Probate. 181 Buchholz held that
although a statute does not specify that certain persons are covered,
standing may be granted if it can be fairly implied. 182
With its emphasis on a statutorily created protectable interest,
the court concluded by holding that "there has likely been an inva
sion of a statutorily protected interest, that there is a causal connec
tion between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's alleged
176. See id. at 1384.
177. See id.
178. Id.
179. See id. The court is not entirely clear, however, about what that interest is.
180. Id. (citing Hartford v. Larrabee Fund Ass'n, 288 A.2d 71 (Conn. 1971)). The
court also noted that in enforcing charitable trusts, the Attorney General is a necessary
party in the suit. See id. (citing Copp v. Barnum, 276 A.2d 893, 894 (Conn. 1970)).
181. See id. at 1385 (citing Bucholz's Appeal from Probate, 519 A.2d 615, 621
(Conn. App. Ct. 1987)).
182. See Bucholz, 519 A.2d at 621. In Buchholz, the father of an adult woman
who was mentally disabled sued for the right to be named the guardian of her estate.
See id. at 616. When the probate court made him a standby guardian and his ex-wife
guardian, he appealed. See id. His case was dismissed by the trial court, which claimed
that he lacked standing under section 45-288 of the General Statutes of Connecticut,
holding that he was not "aggrieved." [d. at 617. The appellate court overturned the
decision and held that although the term "parents" was not contained in the statute, it
was fair to imply that parents had an interest under the statute because of the special
relationship the law grants parent and child. See id. at 619. Further, the court dismissed
an argument that relied on the fact that a 1982 version of section 45-322 of the General
Statutes of Connecticut deleted the requirement of consent by parents before an appli
cation of guardianship could be granted, as not dispositive of whether parents had an
interest under the statute. See id. at 620. The court stated that the deletion was only
because parents of adults who were mentally disabled were often difficult to locate and
not because parents did not have an interest in their child's well being. See id.
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injury, and that a court can redress the injury."183 The appellate
court reversed the trial court by granting standing to the Founda
tion, and ordered the case be tried. 184 The University appealed and
the Connecticut Supreme Court agreed to hear the petition. 185
3.
a.

Connecticut Supreme Court

Majority

The Connecticut Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision, reversed
the appellate court and ruled that CUMIFA did not establish stand
ing for donors under section 45a-533(a).186 Instead, the supreme
court agreed with the trial court that common law applied and only
the Attorney General has standing to sue to enforce the terms of
completed giftS. 187 The majority used statutory interpretation and
common law principles to determine that the Connecticut legisla
ture did not intend CUMIFA to provide standing to a donor who
made a completed charitable gift to an institution. 188
After a presentation of the facts and procedural history, the
majority discussed the common law. 189 The majority stated that at
common law, if one made a completed charitable gift, only the At
torney General could sue to enforce its terms unless the donor re
served the right to enforce its terms in the gift instrument.1 9o The
reason for this is that, by virtue of their position, Attorneys General
are considered "closely associated with the public nature of chari
ties."19I The court noted that others, such as trustees or fiduciaries,
may enforce a charitable trust if they have a special interest but not
"the settlor or his heirs, personal representatives or next of kin."192
In such cases, the Attorney General still must be joined to protect
183. Herzog, 677 A.2d at 1385.
184. See id.
185. See Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 682 A.2d 998
(Conn. 1996). The appeal was limited to whether CUMIFA created statutory standing
for donors to sue to enforce provisions of a charitable gift. See id. at 998.
186. See Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995,
1002 (Conn. 1997).
187. See id.
188. See id. at 997-1002.
189. See id. at 997-99.
190. See id. at 997 & n.2 (citing Attorney Gen. v. First United Baptist Church, 601
A.2d 96, 98 (Me. 1992); Sarkeys v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 40, 592 P.2d 529, 533
(Okla. 1979); Wilbur v. University of Vermont, 270 A.2d 889 (Vt. 1970); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 cmt. f (1959». See supra Part 1.A.2 for a discussion of
enforcement of charitable trusts.
191. Herzog, 699 A.2d at 998 n.3.
192. Id. at 998 n.4 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959».
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the public interest. 193 The court concluded that, under common
law, the Foundation had no standing. 194
Having explained the common law, the court then discussed
the Foundation's contention that the common law had been altered
by the fact that section 45a-533(a) requires the written consent of a
donor in order to alter a gift restriction and thus, standing could be
implied. 195 The court explained that a well-recognized principle of
statutory construction is that courts should not read into the statute
anything that alters the common law; instead, the common law can
be altered only by the "plain meaning" of the statute. 196 The court
193. See id. The court then applied these principles to Herzog because Connecti
cut codified the rule that the Attorney General is the officer in charge of enforcing
charitable gifts in section 3-125 of the General Statutes of Connecticut. See id. at 998
n.3. Section 3-125 codifies the "common law rule and has entrusted the attorney gen
eral with the responsibility and duty to 'represent the public interest in the protection of
any gifts, legacies or devises intended for public or charitable purposes ....'" Id. (quot
ing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-125 (1997».
194. See id. at 999.
195. See id. at 999 & n.6.
196. Id. at 997 (citing State v. Luzietti, 646 A.2d 85, 88 (Conn. 1994); State v.
Sanchez, 528 A.2d 373, 376 (Conn. 1987); Ahem v. City of New Haven, 459 A.2d 118,
121 (Conn. 1983». In each of the cited cases, the court held that courts cannot alter the
common law further than the words in a statute allow.
In Luzietti, a defendant was charged with the crime of operating a motor vehicle
while his license was under suspension. See Luzietti, 646 A.2d at 86. The issue before
the court was whether a statute allowing a trial court to reduce a defendant's sentence
also conferred authority on the court to re-hear a motion for acquittal after the court
had denied such a motion and upheld the defendant's conviction. See id. at 86-88. The
trial court initially denied the defendant's motion for acquittal and the defendant began
serving his sentence. The court granted a motion to re-argue the motion for acquittal
and subsequently granted the acquittal motion based on recently discovered informa
tion that insufficient evidence was presented to the jury to support its verdict of operat
ing a vehicle while his license was suspended. The state argued that the judge did not
have the jurisdiction to vacate the conviction because the defendant had already begun
serving his sentence. See id. at 86-87. The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that there
was no legislative grant of power to reconsider the motion. It then applied the common
law rule that denies a court jurisdiction to modify its judgment, and held that the trial
court could not reconsider the motion. See id. at 88. The court ruled that the statute
would have allowed the court to reduce the sentence of the defendant. See id.
In the Sanchez case, the defendant was charged with perjury while providing an
alibi for her boyfriend during the boyfriend's trial for burglary, assault, and larceny. See
Sanchez, 528 A.2d at 374. Sanchez had testified that she and her boyfriend took
Sanchez's daughter out of school and all three were in Massachusetts at the time of the
crime. See id. The attendance records for the daughter indicated that she was in school
on the day in question. See id. at 374-75. The issue before the court was how much
corroboration the state needed to prove perjury under a Connecticut perjury statute
which was silent on the issue. See id. at 375-79; see also id. at 373 n.1 (citing section 53a
156(a) of the General Statutes of Connecticut, which defines perjury). The court ruled
that since the statute was silent, and the legislative history did not contain any evidence
that the statute was "anything but a direct codification of the common law crime of
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pointed out that even the Foundation conceded that there is noth
ing in the plain language of the statute expressly giving donors the
right to sue. 197
The court further supported its rejection of the appellate
court's reading of subsection (a) by an analysis of the intent of the
Connecticut legislature. 198 In order to do so, like the trial and ap
pellate courts, the supreme court used the notes to UMIFA and the
legislative history of CUMIFA to fill. in gaps in the text of
CUMIFA.199 From UMIFA, the court relied on the Prefatory Note
and the Comment to section 7. 200 First, the court noted that the
Prefatory Note to UMIFA states that UMIFA was created to allow
colleges and universities to use their endowments more efficiently
by providing "[a]n expeditious means to modify obsolete restric
tions."201 The court said that UMIFA's Prefatory Note also states
that colleges and universities had been facing uncertainty in the law
of investment because "there [was] virtually no statutory law ...
and [the] case law [was] sparse."202 From this, the court concluded
that colleges and universities were the intended beneficiaries of the
law. 203 Second, the court noted that the Prefatory Note to UMIFA
states that the Ford Foundation commissioned a study "to examine
perjury," the court should apply the common law rule. Id. at 376. The common law
rule was that the state had to have one live witness and corroboration from another
source. In this case, the only evidence was the school attendance record and that was
not enough. See id.
Ahern involved a group of New Haven police officers who were convicted of illegal
wiretapping. See Ahern, 459 A.2d at 118. The officers sued New Haven to recover the
costs of defending themselves. See id. The officers argued that a 1975 amendment to a
statute, indemnifying government officials, applied to their case even though the illegal
actions took place before the amendment was passed. See id. at 121. Ahem argued
that the lawsuit was brought after the statute was amended, and thus, applied to him.
The court said that the applicable time period was when the violation occurred and
refused to retroactively apply the statute. See id. The court said that the common law
insulating government officials from tort liability applied in this case. See id.
This Note argues infra Part III that the use of these criminal cases was not appro
priate in Herzog because criminal statutes involve constitutional due process considera
tions and civil statutes do not.
197. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1000.
198. See id. at 1000-02.
199. See id. See supra Parts II.B.I-2 for a discussion of the use of legislative his
tory by the trial and appellate courts.
200. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1000-01. See supra Part I.C.3 for a discussion of the
notes to UMIFA.
201. Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1000 (quoting UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL
FUNDS Acr Prefatory Note, 7A U.L.A. 706 (1985)).
202. Id. (quoting UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS Acr Prefatory
Note, 7A U.L.A. 706 (1985)).
203. See id.
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the legal restrictions" on colleges which made them invest their en
dowments conservatively.204 The court concluded that, since the
drafters of UMIFA relied on the Ford Foundation study, the draft
ers "attempted to offer as much relief as possible to charitable insti
tutions, without any mention of concern regarding a donor's ability
to bring legal action to enforce the condition on a gift."205 Third,
the court endorsed the University's claim that the Comment to sec
tion 7 of UMIFA said that the donor would not have a right to
enforce a gift restriction, but "may only acquiesce in a lessening of a
restriction already in effect."206 Fourth, although the above Com
ment about the right to enforce a restriction arose in the context of
a debate about an income tax deduction, the supreme court re
jected the appellate court's limit on the meaning of that Comment
to tax purposes. 207 Instead, the court held that the sentence in the
Comment means exactly what it says: only the Attorney General
can bring suit and, therefore, the donor does not have standing to
do SO.208 Fifth, the court stated that there is no evidence that the
drafters of either UMIFA or CUMIFA intended that the donor
would supplant the Attorney General as the enforcer of the terms
of a gift. 209
After its analysis of the notes and comments to UMIFA, the
court then turned to the legislative history of CUMIFA.210 The
court made two arguments to support its conclusion that the Con
necticut legislature did not intend to establish donor standing when
it enacted CUMIFA.211 First, the court said that the legislature
"knows how to establish statutory standing and it has done so
unambiguously in a plethora of instances."212 Second, the court be
lieved that the legislative history itself showed that donor standing
204. Id. (quoting UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS Acr Prefatory
Note, 7A U.L.A. 706 (1985».
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1001 (quoting UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS Acr § 7
cmt., 7A U.L.A. 724 (1985».
207. See id. The debate centered around the fact that under section 170(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code, a donor who has not "permanently surrendered 'dominion and
control'" over his charitable donation cannot take a tax deduction. Id. See supra Part
1.A.3 for a discussion of section 170(a). It is important to note that the court's analysis
did not address the fact that Herzog was a tax exempt foundation and did not face loss
of a tax deduction.
208. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1001.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 1002.
211. See id.
212. Id. The court cited two instances: "General Statutes § 42-110g(a) (private
cause of action based on violation of Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act); General
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was discussed and rejected. 213 To support its position, the court
quoted Representative James T. Healey, who said" 'if the donor
has seen fit to spell out restrictions, then those restrictions govern.
This bill steps in only in the event that [the donor] has not spelled
out the restrictions.'''214 The court also quoted Representative
DaVid Neiditz, who stated" 'the bill generally leaves it to the donor
to make his own proVisionsJor the matters covered in the bill. The
bill applies when the donor has not specified another way."'215 In
its analysis of the legislative history of UMIFA and CUMIFA,2I6
the court concluded that if CUMIFA was read to establish standing
for donors, it would defeat CUMIFA's purpose of making it easier
for colleges and universities to free themselves of gift restrictions
"by Virtue of the potential of lengthy and complicated litigation."217
The supreme court reversed the appellate court and remanded the
case to the appellate court, instructing it to affirm the trial court's
decision not to grant standing to the Foundation. 218

b.

Dissent

The two judges who joined in dissent in Herzog endorsed the
reasoning of the appellate court219 because they believed that this
decision would have a chilling effect on donations to Connecticut
schools.220 They said that the decision of the supreme court was
akin to the donee "double-crossing the donor ... with impunity."221
The two endorsed the "thoughtful and well reasoned opinion of the
Statutes § 46a-99 (persons aggrieved by violations of antidiscrimination statute 'may
petition the Superior Court for appropriate reJief)." Id.
213. See id.
214. Id. (quoting House Proceeding, supra note 12, at 5732).
215. Id. (quoting House Proceeding, supra note 12, at 5726).
216. See supra Part LCA for a discussion of the legislative history of CUMIFA.
217. Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1002 (discussing the court's conclusion about legislative
intent based on its reading of the legislative histories of both UMIFA and CUMIFA).
218. See id.
219. See supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of the appellate court decision. The
dissenting opinion was very brief and simply referred the reader to the appellate deci
sion. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1002 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
220. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1002 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
221. Id. (McDonald, J., dissenting). The dissent stated the following:
This decision is simply an approval of a donee, in the words of the donor,
"double-crossing the donor," and doing it with impunity unless an elected at
torney general does something about it. This decision will not encourage do
nations to Connecticut colleges and universities. I fail to see why Connecticut,
the home of so many respected schools that would honor their promises,
should endorse such sharp practices and create a climate in this state that will
have a chilling effect on gifts to its educational institutions.
Id.

162

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:131

Appellate Court."222
III.

UMIFA & CUMIFA CREATE A LIMITED RIGHT TO SUE
FOR THE DONOR

In Carll. Herzog Foundation, Inc. v. University of
Bridgeport,223 the Connecticut Supreme Court decided that the
Foundation did not have standing by applying a rule of statutory
construction whereby a court should not go beyond the common
law in interpreting statutes unless the language of the statute explic
itly alters the common law. 224 Further, the court looked to the offi
cial comments to UMIFA and the legislative history to CUMIFA to
discern legislative intent to grant donors standing under
CUMIFA.225 The court held that there was no evidence of legisla
tive intent to supplant the common law rule that only the Attorney
General may sue to enforce the terms of a completed gift. 226 The
Connecticut Appellate Court held that one may imply standing
based on the "written consent" requirement of section 45a
533(a).227 The dissent in Herzog endorsed the appellate court's ap
proach and expressed concern that the Connecticut Supreme
Court's holding in Herzog might cause donors to hesitate to donate
money to charitable institutions if they believe that their wishes will
be flouted "with impunity."228
There is another approach to the problem of donor standing
under CUMIFA, however. One can view the legal interest created
by CUMIFA as a donor's right to a process which don.'ees must ob
serve in order to change restrictions on completed gifts. Recasting
the legal right CUMIFA created for donors as the right to a process
allows donor standing in a limited way that addresses and resolves
both the weaknesses of the majority decision in Herzog and the
concerns raised by all sides of the controversy.229
222. Id. (McDonald, J., dissenting). See supra Part II.B.2 for the appellate
court's opinion.
223. 699 A.2d 995 (Conn. 1997).
224. See id. at 997.
225. See id. at 1000-02.
226. See id. at 1002.
227. See supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of the analysis applied by the appellate
court.
228. Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1002 (McDonald, J., dissenting). See supra Part II.B.3
for a further discussion of the dissent.
229. See infra Part I1I.B for a discussion of limiting donor standing to the right to
enforce the process of releasing gift restrictions outlined in CUMIFA.
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The Weaknesses of the Connecticut Supreme Court's Decision
in Herzog

The Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in Herzog contains
several weaknesses. 23o First, the court's analysis disregarded the
plain language of the statute, which clearly alters the common law.
In doing so, the court contravened one of its own well-established
rules of statutory construction. Second, in determining its statutory
construction, the court relied upon cases that are questionable as
precedent for the Herzog case. Third, the court's discussion of leg
islative intent was based upon inconclusive legislative history.
Fourth, the court's decision allowed the University to violate
CUMIFA with impunity.
1.

The Court's Decision Disregarded the Plain Language
of CUMIFA, Which Clearly Alters the
Common Law

The first weakness in the Herzog case is that the Connecticut
Supreme Court ignored the plain language of the statute, which
clearly alters the common law. In doing so, the court disregarded
its own well-established rule for statutory construction. The Con
necticut Supreme Court said that there was nothing in the legisla
tive history to CUMIFA that suggested that the legislature wanted
to "supplant" the common law rule that the Attorney General is
the enforcer of the terms of charitable gifts. 231 However, this state
ment ignores the fact that, under common law, donors had no
power to consent to any change in a completed gift. 232 Under com
mon law, the written consent of the donor was not required to alter
restrictions on completed gifts. The donor had control over a com
pleted gift only if he took the initiative to reserve such power in the
gift instrument. 233 CUMIFA, on the other hand, allows the written
consent of the donor to alter the terms of a gift restriction and does
not mention reserving such power in the gift instrument. 234 The
230. This Note argues that the primary reason for the flaws in the Herzog deci
sion stems from the fact that the court incorrectly labeled the right the statute created
in the donor as a property interest in the gift. See infra Part III.B for a discussion of
this point.
231. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1002.
232. Such consent, presented to a court in an action for cy pres, would have been
meaningless. See supra Part 1.A.4 for discussion of donor rights under the common law
and the doctrine of cy pres.
233. See supra Part I.A for a discussion of the common law of charitable trusts.
234. This argument is different from what the Connecticut Supreme Court said.
The court stated that one should apply the common law rule that only donors who
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court's opinion ignores the fact that section 45a-533(a) alters the
common law in that it allows donors to consent to changes in a
completed gift and gives legal force to that consent by permitting
charitable institutions to avoid the costs of having to go to court to
change the terms of the gift. 235
The court's opinion also is problematic because it does not ad
dress section 45a-533(b), which does state, explicitly, when the
drafters expected the Attorney General to be heard. 236 If the do
nor's written consent "cannot be obtained by reason of his death,
disability, unavailability, or impossibility of identification," the do
nee may ask a court to release the restriction and the Attorney
General must have an opportunity to be heard. 237 The Connecticut
Supreme Court did not discuss how its decision to deny donors a
statutory implied private right of action under section 45a-533(a)
impacts on the proper reading of section 45a-533(b).
In disregarding both the plain language of the statute and the
impact of section 45a-533(a) on section 45a-533(b), the court failed
to follow its own principle of statutory construction: all parts of the
statute should be given meaning. 238 This principle of statutory con
struction, noticeably absent in the Herzog decision, is a presump
tion that every "sentence, clause, or phrase in a legislative
enactment" has a purpose. 239 The Connecticut Supreme Court has
said that "[s]tatutes should be construed so that no part of a legisla
tive enactment is to be treated as insignificant and unnecessary."240
In addition, this rule of statutory construction comports with what
the United States Supreme Court said in Bennett v. Spear:241 it is a
court's "duty 'to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word'
reserved control in the gift instrument could modify and revoke gifts. See supra Part
II.B.3 for a discussion of the Connecticut Supreme Court's reasoning.
The argument that section 45a-533 of CUMIFA goes beyond the common law is
reinforced by the discussion, infra this subsection, of another rule of statutory construc
tion that Connecticut courts follow: the presumption that all parts of a statute have
meaning.
235. See supra Parts LA, I.C, II.B.3. For a discussion of the fact that the Connect
icut Supreme Court stated that one purpose of CUMIFA was to allow donees to avoid
litigation costs, see supra note 217 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 102 for a complete text of section 45a-533 of the General
Statutes of Connecticut.
237. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-533(b) (1997). See supra note 102 for the complete
text of section 45a-533.
238. See, e.g., State ex reI Kennedy v. Frauwirth, 355 A.2d 39, 41 (Conn. 1974)
(citing Charlton Press, Inc. v. Sullivan, 214 A.2d 354, 357 (Conn. 1965».
239. Id. (quoting Charlton Press, 214 A.2d at 357).
240. Id.
241. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).

DONOR STANDING UNDER UMIFA

1999]

165

... rather than to emasculate an entire section" of a statute. 242 It is
not clear why the Connecticut Supreme Court did not apply this
rule in its decision. 243
Under the Connecticut Supreme Court's analysis, section 45a
533(b) is rendered "insignificant and unnecessary," contrary to the
courts principle of presuming purpose in every sentence of a stat
ute. 244 That is, in assuming that the Attorney General always is the
only one who can sue to enforce gift restrictions, the court does not
explain why the statute specifically lists conditions under which the
Attorney General must be heard. 245 The decision of the Connecti
cut Supreme Court seems to "emasculate" section 45a-533(b) be
cause when the court created a role for the Attorney General in
section 45a-533(a) where none existed, it made section 45a-533(b)
unnecessary. None of the Connecticut courts discussed section 45a
533(b) and the impact that finding or denying standing would have
on it.
2.

The Court's Solution to Donor Standing Under
CUMIFA is Based on Questionable Precedent

The Connecticut Supreme Court based its decision on ques
tionable precedent. The court relied on cases containing a rule for
analyzing statutes which replace or codify common law: 246 State v.
Luzietti,247 State v. Sanchez,248 and Ahern v. City of New Haven. 249
The rule that the Connecticut Supreme Court used in these cases is
242. Id. at 173 (quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538 (1955)
(quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,30 (1937))) (alteration in
original).
243. The Connecticut Appellate Court applied the rule implicitly in its decision
when it said "[i]t would be anomalous for a statute to provide for [the] written consent
[of the] donor ... and then deny that donor access to the courts ...." Carl J. Herzog
Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 677 A.2d 1378, 1385 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996),
rev'd, 699 A.2d 995 (Conn. 1997).
244. Frauwirth, 355 A.2d at 4l.
245. If the donor's written consent "cannot be obtained by reason of his death,
disability, unavailability, or impossibility of identification," the donee can ask a court to
release the restriction and the Attorney General must have an opportunity to be heard.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-533(b) (1997). See supra note 102 for the complete text of
section 45a-533.
246. See Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995,
997 (Conn. 1997); supra Part II.B.3.
247. 646 A.2d 85 (Conn. 1994). See supra note 196 for a discussion of the facts of
Luzietti.
248. 528 A.2d 373 (Conn. 1987). See supra note 196 for a discussion of the facts
of Sanchez.
249. 459 A.2d 118 (Conn. 1983). See supra note 196 for a discussion of the facts
of Ahern.
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that courts may not go beyond the common law if the language of
the statute does not explicitly allow it. 250 The supreme court did
not explain why it applied this rule instead of the analysis for a
statutory implied private right of action. 251 It is important to note
that none of the three cases involved a standing issue. Instead, each
case dealt with people charged with crimes. 252 Further, none of the
cases covered issues for which an alternative test was available.
However, with Herzog, the test for standing was an available alter
native, and it is a test the Connecticut courts use at other times. 253
A rule prohibiting the alteration of the common law in criminal
matters is an important one, given that criminals are entitled to con
stitutionally protected due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution. 254 Altering the common law af
ter arrest would at least raise the issue of notice. 255 But the rele
vance of these cases remains a critical question because the court
did not adequately explain why it used a rule of statutory construc
tion developed for criminal cases instead of traditional implied pri
vate right of action analysis when it decided Herzog.
Furthermore, the rule stating that courts may not go beyond
the common law in statutory interpretation, particularly as it is ar
ticulated in Sanchez, would not apply to section 45a-533(a) of
CUMIFA even if one could argue that it might apply to other kinds
of statutes. In Sanchez, the court stated that it did not go beyond
the common law because there was no indication that the statute
was "anything but a direct codification of the common law crime of
perjury."256 However, in the text of section 45a-533(a:) ofCVMIFA
the legislature has gone beyond the common law. 257
The other cases that the Connecticut Supreme Court relied
upon in the Herzog decision were of two types, both of which also
250. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 999.
251. This Note argues, infra Part III.B, that one explanation for this confusion
over which analysis to use stems from the fact that the courts cast the legal interest
incorrectly as an interest in the gift itself.
252. See supra note 196 for a discussion of the facts of these cases.
253. See supra Part I.B for examples of cases where the Connecticut courts used
analysis for statutory implied private right of action.
254. See LaChance v. Erickson, 118 S. Ct. 753, 756 (1998) ("The core of due pro
cess is the right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard." (citing Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,542 (1985))); United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S.
259, 265-67 (1997) (stating that, in criminal cases, due process includes notice).
255. See Lanier, 520 U.S. at 265-67; see also LaChance, 118 S. Ct. at 756.
256. State v. Sanchez, 528 A.2d 373, 376 (Conn. 1987).
257. See supra Parts LA and I.C for a discussion of how CUMIFA altered the
common law.
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are questionable precedent. First, there were cases that dealt with
standing to enforce charitable trustS.258 In those cases, standing was
interpreted according to the common law, allowing only the Attor
ney General and persons with a special interest to sue to enforce
the terms of gifts.259 However, these cases are of doubtful value to
Herzog because they did not involve a statute at all. 260 The second
set of cases upon which the Connecticut Supreme Court relied also
are not on point because, while they dealt with interpreting and
applying other sections of CUMIFA, they did not concern the issue
of donor standing. 261
3.

The Court Based Its Analysis of Legislative Intent upon
Inconclusive Legislative History

The third aspect of the Herzog decision that is problematic is
258. See supra note 190 and infra note 259 for a list of the cases upon which the
majority relied.
259. See Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995,
997-98 (Conn. 1997). The court cited the following cases from the common law: Lopez
v. Medford Community Center, Inc., 424 N.E.2d 229 (Mass. 1981) (stating plaintiffs had
to join Attorney General when members of charitable corporation brought action
against board of directors for corporate mismanagement); Marin Hospital District v.
Department of Health, 154 Cal. Rptr. 838 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (holding hospital did not
buy the computerized body scanner for which it solicited donations, but donors may not
recover their money); Lefkowitz v. Lebensfeld, 417 N.Y.S.2d 715 (App. Div. 1979)
(holding Attorney General had no standing to sue on behalf of recipients of charitable
gift of stock who sued to be paid those dividends. Attorney General has no standing to
sue on behalf of ultimate beneficiaries); Sarkeys v. Independent School District No. 40,
592 P.2d 529 (Okla. 1979) (holding Attorney General had authority to settle suit where
Attorney General was party when school sued descendants of charitable foundation for
indirect self-dealing); Wier v. Howard Hughes Medical Institute, 407 A.2d 1051 (Del.
Ch. 1979) (holding only Attorney General has the right to enforce charitable trust, not
the administrator of the charitable trust who tried to apply the intention of the donor);
Hagaman v. Board of Education, 285 A.2d 63 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971) (holding
son of deceased donor denied return of property conveyed under condition that school
be built, when school ultimately closed and used as park, because there were no words
in the instrument making a grant of a fee simple determinable or condition subsequent);
Wilbur v. University of Vermont, 270 A.2d 889 (Vt. 1970) (holding that charitable trust
does not fail simply because trustees violate the terms of the trust; heirs may not compel
reversion, but Attorney General can sue trustees to force observance of trust); McGee
v. Vandeventer, 158 N.E. 127 (Ill. 1927) (holding abuse of trust does not cause reverter
unless there is a reserved right in gift, but equity allows Attorney General to sue to
compel observance of conditions). See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 997-99.
260. See supra Parts LA and I.C for a discussion of how CUMIFA altered the
common law.
261. Herzog was the first case in which the issue of donor standing under
CUMIFA arose. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1000 (citing Yale Univ. v. Blumenthal, 621
A.2d 1304, 1306 (Conn. 1993».
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the court's reliance on legislative intent. 262 There is no indication in
either the comments to UMIFA or the legislative history to
CUMIFA of what the legislature intended regarding donor standing
under section 45a-533(a}.263 When it discussed its reading of legis
lative intent, therefore, the court, extrapolated from other parts of
the comments and legislative history.264
The most problematic issue concerning the court's reliance on
the legislative history is that the history itself is scant. First, there is
no recorded legislative history from the Connecticut Senate. As a
result, at best, one can speak of a legislative intent only for the Con
necticut House. In the House of Representatives, of the one hun
dred forty-one members voting on the bill, only seven made
statements about the bill itself, and all seemed to offer different
reasons for supporting it. 265 Given this record, it is reasonable to
ask whether one can glean anything about legislative intent from
the statements of five percent of the one half of the Connecticut
state legislature. 266 It is also reasonable to ask how many of the
seven House members were actively thinking about donor standing
when they rose to speak about CUMIFA. When a court bases a
large part of its decision on a scant record, in which there is no
discussion of the issue the court is deciding, it runs the risk of seem
ing to manipulate the record in order to reach a desired outcome,
which, in turn, may undermine public confidence in the judicial
system.
Because there is no direct legislative history, the court relied
upon segments of the official comments to UMIFA that addressed a
tax issue rather than standing. 267 The court identified the tax issue
262. See supra Part II.B.3 for a discussion of the supreme court's reliance on
legislative intent.
263. See supra Part LC.4 for a discussion of the intent of the Connecticut
legislature.
.
264. See supra Part II.B.3 for a discussion of the Connecticut Supreme Court's
analysis. There are many law review articles which address the problems of trying to
base a decision on legislative intent. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statu
tory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990);
Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory
Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REv. 593 (1995).
265. See House Proceeding, supra note 12. The Representatives who spoke have
been quoted supra Parts LC.4 and ILB.3. They are: Bingham, Neiditz, Demerell, Web
ber, Healey, Dooley, and Bevacqua. Representative Churchill spoke, but only to recuse
himself for possible conflict of interest. See House Proceeding, supra note 12, at 5727.
266. Since there is no legislative record from the Senate, one cannot know
whether there was discussion at all.
267. See Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995,
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as the potential for donors to lose their tax deduction if they were
granted standing to sue and used the tax concern to bolster its deci
sion to deny standing to donors.268 The court's use of the tax issue
presents problems, however. In this particular case, taxes seem to
be irrelevant because the Herzog Foundation is a tax exempt organ
ization and, by definition, cannot take tax deductions. 269
4.

The Court's Decision Allowed the University to Disobey
CUMIFA with Impunity270

As the dissent in Herzog stated, the Connecticut Supreme
Court's decision may send the wrong message to both donors and
donees. 271 The dissent stated that the signal the Herzog decision
may send to potential donors is that their wishes can be disregarded
"with impunity," resulting in a two-fold risk. 272 The first risk is that
donors will now be reluctant to make gifts to charitable institu
tions.273 The second risk is that the decision, while purporting to
help charities, will hurt those institutions in the long run.274 These
1001-02 (Conn. 1997); supra Part II.B.3. The court also relied upon the Comment to
section 7 of UMIFA for this part of its analysis. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1001-02; supra
Part II.B.3.
268. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1001; supra Part II.B.3.
269. See supra Part I.A.3 for a discussion of the tax issues implicated in Herzog.
Section 500 of the Internal Revenue Code covers tax exempt organizations. See 1.R.e.
§ 501-509 (West Supp. 1998). Section 501(c) lists the kinds of organizations that are tax
exempt, such as foundations and corporations operated for religious, charitable, educa
tional, or literary purposes. See 1.R.e. § 501(c) for a complete list of purposes and
organizations. The section also states that organizations cannot devote monies to "in
fluence legislation" or to "political campaign[s]." Id. § 501(c). Since foundations are
tax exempt, if they donate money to other charitable organizations, they cannot take a
tax deduction under section 170. See I.R.e. § 170, for the list of deductions. Of course,
individual donors who do not have foundations set up can take a deduction for charity.
See supra Part 1.A.3 for a discussion of charitable deductions for individuals. Private
foundations are covered specifically by 1.R.e. §§ 507-509.
See Charles E. Muller, II, Private Foundations-Self Dealing (Section 4941), Tax
Mgmt. (BNA), at A-I (1996), and Sue Stem Stewart & Johanna V. Bartlett, Private
Foundations-Distributions (Sec. 4942),880 Tax Mgmt. (BNA) (1996), for more infor
mation about tax exempt foundations and their regulation in the Internal Revenue
Code. There is a larger question, beyond the scope of this Note, about whether any
statute should be interpreted based on tax implications which, of course, could be
changed by the Congress at any time. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. l.
270. See Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995,
1002 (Conn. 1997) (McDonald, J., dissenting).
271. See id. (McDonald, J., dissenting).
272. Id. (McDonald, J., dissenting).
273. See id. (McDonald, J., dissenting).
274. See id. (McDonald, J., dissenting).
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risks may cause either a decrease in gifts to charities,275 or an in
crease in donors reserving an interest in the gift instrument.
Indeed, at least one practitioner is advising estate planners to
take into account the Herzog decision in considering how to create
charitable gift instruments. 276 He took special note that colleges
and universities supported the majority decision with amici curiae
briefs. 277 His suggestion for avoiding the problems donors face in
light of the decision was to use "'reverter' clauses. "278 If a right of
reverter is inserted into the gift instrument, then the donor retains a
specific right to control the gift and takes that right away from the
Attorney General.279
The decision in Herzog disregarded the plain language of
CUMIFA, relied upon questionable precedent and inconclusive leg
islative history, and allowed the University of Bridgeport to violate
CUMIFA. A better result might have been reached had the court
used its test for statutory implied private rights of action to decide
the case. 280
B.

The Legal Interest CUMIFA Creates is the Right to a Process,
the Violation of Which Gives Donors Standing

The Connecticut courts were correct in holding that CUMIFA
did not create a donor's right in a charitable gift itself. However,
the right that CUMIFA did create is a right to a process which do
nees must observe in order to change restrictions on completed
gifts.
1.

Connecticut Courts Analyzed Whether CUMIFA
Created a Donor's Legal Interest in the Gift Itself

In Herzog, each level of the Connecticut courts analyzed
whether CUMIFA created a legal interest for the donor in the
gift. 281 Given the legal interest the courts analyzed, it is under
275. See id. (McDonald, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority decision will
"create a climate ... that will have a chilling effect on gifts to [the state's] educational
institutions").
276. See Ronald R. Volkmer, Can Donor Enforce Charitable Gift?, 25 EST. PLAN.
138, 139 (1998).
277. See id.
278. Id. Reverter clauses create a reversionary interest in the donor. See supra
note 6 for a discussion of reversionary interests.
279. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 998-99.
280. See infra Part III.B.
281. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 997-1002; Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University
of Bridgeport, 677 A.2d 1378, 1381-85 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996); Carl J. Herzog Found.,
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stand able why the supreme court was reluctant to grant such an
interest to the donor. Such an interest indeed may have altered
common law beyond what the Connecticut legislature may have in
tended. 282 But, in trying to preserve the main purpose of the stat
ute, to make it easier for donees to alter the terms of charitable
gifts, the court's analysis created its own problems. 283 A better
reading of the legal interest CUMIFA created is to follow the plain
language of section 45a-533(a) through 45a-533(d), which outlines a
process by which donees can alter terms of a charitable gift.
2.

The Plain Language of CUMIFA Creates a Legally
Protected Interest in a Process by Which Donees
May Alter Gifts

A reading of the plain language of CUMIFA's section 45a-533
clearly shows a process by which a charitable institution may alter
the terms of a gift. Under section 45a-533(a), the donee may simply
obtain the written consent of the donor. 284 If consent is obtained,
the donee avoids the cost of litigation and the gift is altered. 285
Under section 45a-533(b), if the donor's "consent cannot be ob
tained by reason of his death, disability, unavailability, or impossi
bility of identification," the donee may ask the court to release the
restriction and the Attorney General must have the opportunity to
be heard. 286 Section 45a-533(c) directs that a "release" under sec
tion 45a-533 cannot be granted for anything other than charitable
purposes. 287 Section 45a-533(d) states that courts may still use cy
pres .288 It is important to note that the Connecticut courts did not
analyze what would happen under CUMIFA if a donor was availInc. v. University of Bridgeport, No. CV-94-0137902-S, 1995 WL 128255, at *2-3 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Mar. 17, 1995). See supra Part II for a discussion of the legal analysis of
Herzog by all three Connecticut courts.
282. One can imply this because it is clear that the primary purpose of CUMIFA
was to make it easier on donees who needed to alter the terms of charitable gifts. See
supra Part I.e. But, the mechanism chosen to accomplish that purpose, allowing do
nors to consent to changes, empowered donors to a degree they never had under the
common law.
283. See supra Part lILA for a discussion of the flaws in the reasoning of the
supreme court, and supra Part I.C for a discussion of CUMIFA's purpose.
284. See supra note 102 for the text of section 45a-533 of the General Statutes of
Connecticut.
285. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1002.
286. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-533(b) (1997).
287. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-533(c) (1997). For the sake of argument, this
Note assumes that subsection (c) refers to releases both by the donor (subsection (a»
and by the court (subsection (b».
288. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-533(d) (1997).
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able but refused to consent to changes in the gift. 289 Since subsec
tion (b) is specific about when it applies and does not specifically
list donor refusal to consent, it is reasonable to argue that subsec
tion (d) would apply; the common law process of cy pres would
therefore have to be used. 290
Given that CUMIFA specifically outlines the process by which
a donee can alter the terms of a charitable gift, it is reasonable to
assume two things. First, CUMIFA is now the process by which ,
donees may alter the terms of gifts. This is a reasonable interpreta
tion of CUMIFA because the statute creates a new process, yet spe
cifically incorporates the only common law method of gift
alteration, cy pres. Second, CUMIFA grants the donor a role in
that process. Since section 45a-533(a) makes the donor part of the
process, it is reasonable to argue that the statute creates a legally
protected interest in the process for the donor. Thus, when the
University altered the terms of Herzog's gift, without following
either subsection 45a-533 (a), (b), or (d) of CUMIFA, it injured
Herzog's legal interest in the process. A statutory implied private
right of action may be found once the injury is recast in this way,
and a donor whose interest is violated has standing to sue.
Further, labeling the legal interest as an interest in the process
avoids the problems which concerned the Connecticut Supreme
Court. For example, if the interest is an interest in the process, the
donor does not have an interest in the gift itself, and no tax
problems are created. Furthermore, because the gifts themselves
remain in the charitable sector, there is no need for concern that
donors will use the written consent section of CUMIFA to revoke
their gifts. 291
289. Although the appellate court stated that the donor could refuse to give its
consent, it did not analyze what would happen if such an event occurred. See Carll.
Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 677 A.2d 1378, 1381 (Conn. App. Ct.
1996), rev'd, 699 A.2d 995 (1997).
290. See supra Part 1.A.4 for a discussion of cy pres. A Connecticut court has
applied section 45a-533(d), cy pres, when donors were dead, and thus, could not con
sent to changes in gift restrictions. See Hartford Hosp. v. Blumenthal, No. CV-95
0555462-S, 1996 WL 240440, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. April 15, 1996).
The linking of the subsections of section 45a-533 of CUMIFA is suggested in the
Prefatory Note to UMIFA, which states that the statute allows a release of gift restric
tions "by donor acquiescence or court action." UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL
FUNDS ACT Prefatory Note, 7A Part II U.L.A. 477 (1999) (emphasis added). See supra
note 100 and accompanying text for the full text.
291. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-533(a) (1997). This solution would also avoid
the problem of reconciling the Comment to section 7 of UMIFA which states that do
nors have no property interest in the gift. See supra Part I.C.3. See infra Part IIl.B.3.d
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Once the Right is Labeled as the Right to Have Donees
Observe the Process CUMIFA Outlines, Donors
Have a Statutory Implied Private Right of
Action and thus Have Standing

Standing and private right of action analysis in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, Bennett v. Spear, and National
Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank
& Trust CO.292

In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,293 Bennett v. Spear294 and
National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank &
Trust Co. ,295 the United States Supreme Court provided analysis of
standing and the statutory implied private right of action. In Ben
nett v. Spear,296 the United States Supreme Court held that, when a
statute does not explicitly confer standing on a particular individual,
the plaintiff must first satisfy the "'case' or 'controversy' require
ment of Article III, which is the 'irreducible constitutional mini
mum."'297 Thus, the plaintiff must satisfy a three-prong test by
"demonstrat[ing] that he has suffered an 'injury in fact,' that the
injury is 'fairly traceable' to the actions of the defendant, and that
the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision."298
In Lujan, the Supreme Court said that when there is a statute,
any injury must be personally experienced to satisfy the Article III
for a discussion of how recasting the right CUMIFA creates addresses the concerns of
the Connecticut courts.
292. State courts are not required to follow the United States Supreme Court's
analysis for standing. However, this Note presents the Supreme Court analysis for two
reasons. First, it is clear that Connecticut has followed standing analysis as articulated
by the Supreme Court in the past. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of standing
analysis in Connecticut. Second, even if Connecticut refused to follow the analysis
contained in Supreme Court cases, the suggestion in this Note might be useful to courts
in other jurisdictions that might want to consider the Supreme Court analysis as an
alternative way to interpret donor standing under UMIFA.
293. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
294. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
295. 118 S. Ct. 927 (1998).
296. 520 U.S. 154 (1997). In Bennett, the Court found that plaintiffs with com
mercial interests in a proposed irrigation project which the government rejected under
the 1973 Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), 16 U.S.c. § 1531 (1994), had standing to
sue under 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g). The Court found that the plaintiffs fell under the zone
of interests protected by the ESA. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 166.
297. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162.
298. Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61). See supra Part I.B and supra note
79 for a discussion of the Lujan case and other Supreme Court cases addressing stand
ing in general, as well as standing under Connecticut law.
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injury requirement. 2<;}9 An individual can be injured through a vio
lation of the "procedural rights" which a statute outlines, as long as
the injury is connected to the individual's "own concrete harm."3oo
Once a plaintiff can demonstrate a personally experienced in
jury, the zone of interests analysis is used to determine whether the
injury falls within the interests that the statute is designed to pro
tect. 301 In Bennett, the Supreme Court discussed how the "zone of
interests" analysis should be used in determining standing. 302 The
Court held that the zone of interests analysis is part of the standing
test unless such a test is "expressly negated" by Congress. 303
299. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563 (requiring that "the party seeking review be him
self among the injured"). The Court said that it required the injury to be personal
because if courts allowed anyone to sue for an injury to the general public it would be
violating congressional authority to vindicate interests of the general public. See id. at
576-77.
300. Id. at 572 n.7, 573 n.8.
301. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of zone of interests and standing analysis.
302. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 163-65. This discussion was necessary because ear
lier Supreme Court cases did not clearly establish that the zone of interests test was part
of standing analysis. See Kelso & Kelso, supra note 79, at 145.
303. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 163. In Bennett, the Court granted standing to the plain
tiffs, ranchers and irrigation districts, who had economic interests they claimed were
harmed by government protection of endangered fish. They were allowed to bring suit
under two provisions of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). See id. at 176-77.
Regarding the ESA, both the district court and the Ninth Circuit had dismissed the
case for lack of standing, because both held that the zone of interests protected by the
ESA was the preservation of wildlife and that competing commercial interests were not
within the zone of interests. See id. at 160-61. The Supreme Court overturned the
decisions by pointing out that when Congress created the citizen-suit provision of the
ESA, it wrote the following words: "'any person may commence a civil suit.'" Id. at 164
(quoting 16 U.S.c. § 1540(g) (1994». The Court interpreted these words literally and
held that the words negated the zone of interests test of standing under the ESA. How
ever, Justice Scalia noted, in his opinion for the majority, that he believed the words
negated the zone of interests test because they really enlarged the zone of interests to
include every citizen. See id. at 165-66.
The Court then found standing to sue under section 1536(a)(2) of the ESA, which
requires "each agency to 'use the best scientific and commercial data available'" in
making its decisions. Id. at 176. The Court said that the reason standing could be
found is that, in this instance, the zone of interests test should be applied, "not by
reference to the overall purpose of the Act in question (here, species preservation), but
by reference to the particular provision of law upon which the plaintiff relies." Id. at
175-76. The Court agreed with the plaintiffs' contention that the requirement of sec
tion 1536(a)(2) was designed to prevent an overly zealous agency from causing "need
less economic dislocation." Id. at 176. The vehicle the Court used to allow the plaintiffs
a cause of action under section 1536(a)(2) was the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"). The APA allows "a right to judicial review of all 'final agency action for
which there is no other adequate remedy in court: [5 U.S.c.] § 704." Bennett, 520 U.S.
at 175. The only exceptions to this rule are if a statute explicitly excludes judicial review
or if the agency has discretion. The Court stated that neither of the exceptions applied
under the ESA. See id.
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Under the analysis in Bennett, if the statute does not explicitly
state which plaintiffs have standing, then courts should use the
"zone of interests" analysis; however, if the statute does state
which plaintiffs have standing, the test should not be used. 304 In
applying the zone of interests test, the Court said that one does not
look at "the overall purpose of the Act in question . . . but . . .
[refers] to the particular provision of the law upon which the plain
tiff relies" in his claim.305
In National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank
& Trust CO.,306 the Supreme Court further clarified the zone of in
terests test to be used in determining whether a particular individ
ual has standing to sue under a statute which does not explicitly
confer standing. At issue was whether a court should look for a
legislative purpose to benefit the "would-be plaintiff," when con
ducting a zone of interests analysis. 307 The Court held that no such
inquiry is required. 30B All that a court should do is "first discern the
interests 'arguably ... to be protected' by the statutory provision at
issue [and] then inquire whether the plaintiff's interests affected ...
are among them. "309

b.

The Connecticut Supreme Court did not use zone of interests
analysis to determine standing

When it analyzed the standing problem in Herzog, the Con
necticut Supreme Court did not use zone of interests analysis. In
stead, it said that the common law of charitable trusts governed
donor standing unless CUMIFA changed the common law. 310 Be
cause there was nothing in the plain language of CUMIFA explic
304. See Bennett, 520 u.s. at 164. The reason the courts should not use the zone
of interests analysis if the statute explicitly states which plaintiffs have standing is be
cause the court recognizes that Congress has negated the zone of interests test in those
instances. See id.
305. Id. at 175-76. The Court cited other cases which refer to this rule, including
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) and Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). See Bennett, 520
u.s. at 176.
306. 118 S. Ct. 927 (1998). In this case, the Supreme Court allowed banks stand
ing to sue under the provisions of the Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.c.A. § 1759
(West Supp. 1998). The banks challenged an interpretation of a provision of this law.
See National Credit Union, 118 S. Ct. at 930.
307. National Credit Union, 118 S. Ct. at 935.
308. See id.
309. Id. (quoting Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153) (first alteration in original).
310. See Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995,
997-1000 (Conn. 1997).
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itly altering the common law of charitable trusts, the court searched
for a legislative intent to alter the common law. 311 The court found
no legislative intent, but did find a statement from the Comment to
section 7 of UMIFA stating that UMIFA did not create a property
interest in the gift. 312 Because the court had labeled the interest as
a property interest in the gift itself, the court used the Comment to
section 7 of UMIFA to deny standing. 313 No standing or zone of
interests analysis was attempted. 314
c.

Applying the United States Supreme Court's standing and zone
of interests analyses gives the Foundation standing

Had the Connecticut Supreme Court both analyzed the right
CUMIFA confers on the donor as the right to a process rather than
as an interest in the gift, and applied standing and zone of interests
analysis, the outcome in Herzog would have been different.
CUMIFA does not state directly whether donors have standing. 315
Therefore, in light of the United States Supreme Court's decisions
in Lujan, Bennett, and National Credit Union, the courts should
have applied the three part standing test and its implied private
right of action (zone of interests) analysis to Herzog.316 The analy
sis that follows applies the three part standing test and the zone of
interests analysis to the Herzog case. 317 The main focus of analysis
is on the "injury" and zone of interests facets of standing because,
based on the facts, the other two portions of the test, causation by
defendant's actions and ability to receive relief, are clearly met if
the Foundation is within the zone of interests.
1.

Injury

In order to have standing, a plaintiff must personally experi
311. See id. at 1000-02.
312. See id. at 1001.
313. See id.
314. The Connecticut Appellate Court did attempt zone of interests analysis, but
they also labeled the injury as an interest in the gift itself. See Carl J. Herzog Found.,
Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 677 A.2d 1378, 1382 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996), rev'd, 699
A.2d 995 (Conn. 1997).
315. See supra note 102 for the complete text of section 45a-533 of the General
Statutes of Connecticut.
316. The standing doctrine is not without its critics. See generally Fletcher, supra
note 81; Kelso & Kelso, supra note 79; Sunstein, supra note 81.
317. The three parts of the Article III standing test are injury, causation, and
redressability. When there is a statute, the zone of interests analysis is used to deter
mine whether the injury is an interest meant to be protected by the statute. See supra
Part LB.
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ence an injury to a legal interest that is in the zone of interests pro
tected by the statute. 318 The Connecticut courts refer to this as a
"colorable claim."319 In Herzog, section 45a-533(a) of CUMIFA320
required the University to seek the Foundation's written consent to
alterations of the terms the Foundation had placed on its gift. 321
The Foundation's injury was the violation of its right to have the
University follow this process. The injury is direct and personal be
cause the statute describes the nature of the donor's stake in the
process. 322 The personally experienced injury is the denial of the
right to be asked to give its written consent to alter a restriction on
its gift.
In order to determine whether the written consent provision is
within the zone of interests, one can apply the rules that the
Supreme Court set out in Bennett and National Credit Union. That
is, do not look at "the overall purpose of the Act in question ... but
. . . [refer] to the particular provision of the law upon which the
plaintiff relies"323 in his claim, and do not be concerned with a legis
lative intent to protect the prospective plaintiff. 324 Applying these
rules to Herzog, it is clear that the statute's requirement of written
consent of the donor to alter gift restrictions is enough to bring the
donor into the zone of interests protected by the statute. Section
45a-533(a) specifically makes the donor a part of the process of gift
alteration. If the donee wants to change the terms of a gift, the
donee must request the donor's written consent or follow section
45a-533( d) and obtain court permission using cy pres .325 The final
legs of the test for standing are easy to meet once one recognizes
318. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of zone of interests analysis as used by
Connecticut courts.
319. See Gay & Lesbian Law Students Ass'n at the Univ. of Conn. Sch. of Law v.
Board of Trustees, Univ. of Conn., 673 A.2d 484, 490 (Conn. 1996).
320. See supra note 102 for the text of section 45a-533 of the General Statutes of
Connecticut.
321. It is reasonable to assume that if the University chose not to obtain the writ
ten consent of Herzog, section 45a-533(d) of CUMIFA would require the University to
apply for a release under the doctrine of cy pres, as cy pres is the common law rule.
322. See supra Part III.B.3.a for a discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), which requires injuries to be per
sonally experienced.
323. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 175-76 (1997). The Court cited other cases
which refer to this rule, including Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871
(1992), and Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150 (1970). See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 175-76.
324. See National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 118 S. Ct.
927, 935 (1998) (citing Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388,399-400 (1987)).
325. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-533(a), (d) (1997).
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that CUMIFA gives donors the right to a process and any deviation
from the process constitutes an injury under the statute. 326
11.

Causation

The second part of the standing test is whether the injury to the
plaintiff is caused by the action of the defendant. 327 The University
clearly did not request the written consent of the Foundation or
seek court permission when it allegedly put the scholarship money
in with its general funds. 328 Thus, the injury to the Foundation's
right to the process was caused by the University.
iii.

Relief

The third requirement for standing is that the court be able to
grant relief. 329 In Herzog, because the injury is a violation of the
right to a process, the relief allowed should be limited to enforcing
the process for gift alteration as outlined in section 45a-533 of
CUMIFA. That is, standing should be given to donors only to allow
them to force the donee either to request the written consent of the
donor, or to apply to the court for cy pres, as outlined in section
45a-533, subsections (a) and (d), respectively. To allow donors to
force donees to observe the process makes sense, given that in most
states, Attorneys General often do not have the resources to inves
tigate breaches of charitable trusts. 330 The donor is in the best posi
tion to know if the donee has violated the statute, and can act as a
private attorney general in bringing suit. 331
In Herzog, the Foundation asked the court for very specific re
lief, some of which the court could have granted.
The plaintiff requested a temporary and permanent injunction,
ordering the defendant to "segregate from its general funds
matching grants totaling $250,000," an accounting for the use of
the fund from the date of receipt until present, and a reestablish
ment of the fund in accordance with the purposes outlined in the
326. As discussed infra, standing should be limited to the narrow purpose of en
forcing the process outlined by CUMIFA.
327. See supra Part I.B and supra note 79 for a discussion of the causation com
ponent of standing.
328. See supra Part II.A for the facts in Herzog.
329. See supra Part I.B and supra note 79 for a discussion of the relief component
of standing.
330. See Blasko et ai., supra note 42, at 48.
331. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164-65 (1997) (stating that purpose of
"any person" language in the statute was to have private attorney general
enforcement).
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gift instrument, and, in the event that those purposes could not
be fulfilled, to revert the funds and direct them to the Bridgeport
Area Foundation, which is prepared to administer the funds in
accordance with the original agreement. 332
Because CUMIFA gives a donor only the right to enforce a
process, the Connecticut courts could not have granted the last part
of the Foundation's request, returning the gift. The donor does not
control the gift itself. The gift remains in the charitable sector and
the donor's only right is to force the donee to observe the process
for releasing gift restrictions that CUMIFA outlines. However, the
court could have granted the injunction and then forced the Univer
sity to request the Foundation's consent to use the money for a dif
ferent purpose. If the Foundation refused to give consent or the
University refused to ask for written consent, the court could have
forced the University to obtain a release through cy pres .333
d.

Analyzing the donor's legal interest as the right to a process
resolves the concerns over donor standing that the
Connecticut courts raised

Allowing donor standing to enforce the process CUMIFA re
quires to obtain a release from a gift restriction offers a solution
which addresses the concerns raised by all of the Connecticut
courts. It protects donors because it reduces the risk that donees
will violate the statute with impunity. Limited standing addresses
the potential tax issue by preventing the donor from retaining prop
erty rights in the gift. 334 In this regard, this solution is consistent
with the legislative history that addresses tax issues under
332. Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 677 A.2d 1378, 1380
(Conn. App. Ct. 1996), rev'd, 699 A.2d 995 (Conn. 1997).
333. Of course, if a court applied cy pres, it would be free to disregard the donor's
wishes. Thus, although donors have standing to sue under CUMIFA, they have no
control over the outcome of the case. However, the point of the process is to have
some recognition that donors have an interest in a fair process and an interest in know
ing the fate of the gift. This approach is in keeping with the Supreme Court's decision
in Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America v.
City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993). The City of Jacksonville had a law which
required a yearly set aside of city contracts for minority businesses (ten percent of the
total amount of city contracts). See id. at 658. The Supreme Court struck down the
policy, although it was not clear whether any of the plaintiffs would have received the
contracts from bidding on the set asides. The Court recognized their interest in a fair
process. See id. at 664-66. The Court labeled the process as the "opportunity to com
pete." Id. at 666.
334. Although this was not a problem for the Foundation, because foundations
are tax exempt organizations, other donors might face such a tax problem. See supra
Part III.A.3 for a discussion of the irrelevance of the tax issue to the Foundation.
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CUMIFA.335
This solution also protects donees because it should make do
nors inclined to continue to make charitable donations, knowing
that their wishes will be protected under CUMIFA. Limited stand
ing does nothing to alter the common law of charitable trusts that
still exists after CUMIFA's enactment, especially the rule that, once
they make a completed gift, donors have no right to the gift itself
unless reserved in the gift instrument. 336 This solution also makes
the gifts themselves more stable. That is because, although donors
cannot use CUMIFA to enforce the gift itself, if they can be sure
their wishes will be considered, they may not be inclined to include
reversionary interests in the gift instrument. 337
CONCLUSION

A donor who has made a completed gift to a charitable institu
tion should have limited standing to sue under section 45a-533 of
CUMIFA if the gift contains restrictions that the charitable institu
tion has disregarded. In Carll. Herzog Foundation, Inc. v. Univer
sity of Bridgeport, the Connecticut courts mischaracterized the
donor's legal interest as an interest in the gift itself. The Connecti
cut Supreme Court then held that donors have no standing to sue
under CUMIFA. The supreme court's analysis has several weak
nesses, including ignoring the plain language of the statute, relying
on both questionable precedent and scant legislative history, and
allowing the University to ignore the statute with impunity.
The legal right CUMIFA gives donors is not a right to the gift
itself, as the Connecticut courts stated. Instead, CUMIFA creates a
legal interest in a process by which donees are able to alter the
restrictions on charitable gifts. If a donee violates a donor's legally
protected interest in the process, CUMIFA allows donors a right to
sue, but the donor is limited to suing to enforce the process the
statute outlines. Recasting the legal right CUMIFA creates for do
nors is a compromise solution that addresses the concerns the Con
necticut courts expressed. It protects donees by making the gifts
they receive more stable. That stability is two-fold. First, donees
would be free from the worry that donors who make completed
charitable gifts will be able to use CUMIFA's provisions to revoke
335.
336.
337.
advice to

See supra Parts LA.3 and lILA for a discussion of tax issues in this case.
See supra Part LA for a discussion of the common law of charitable trusts.
See supra note 276 and accompanying text for a discussion of a practitioner's
insert reversionary interests in gift instruments.
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gifts without warning. 338 Second, when donors believe that
CUMIFA protects their wishes, they may be less inclined to insert
reversionary clauses into their gift instruments. Thus, donees can
be assured that courts will try to find a way for them to keep gifts
where the restrictions are obsolete. Recasting the legal right also
protects against the tax concerns the Connecticut court expressed.
Limited standing does not create donor control over the gift itself
and tax deductions are thus protected. Finally, donors should gain
satisfaction from the fact that donees will no longer be allowed to
disregard the terms of CUMIFA with impunity.
Paula Kilcoyne

338. A reversionary clause in the gift instrument would provide such advance
warning to donees. See supra note 6 for a discussion of reversionary clauses.

